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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, I examine the influence of CEO political ideology on firm’s 
innovation strategy and outcomes. In my theorizing, I draw on upper-echelons theory that 
underscores the role of executives’ personal orientations on their decisions as well as the 
scholarship in political psychology that demonstrates the different values and psychological 
needs of liberals and conservatives. Given liberals’ lower need to manage uncertainty and their 
openness to new experiences, I propose that a firm with a more liberal CEO is likely to develop 
more innovations, pursue exploratory innovations and develop innovations with extreme quality 
(high and low). I also build on liberals’ stakeholder orientation to corporate governance and their 
openness to new experiences to argue that liberal CEOs are more likely than their conservative 
counterparts to engage in basic research. Furthermore, considering liberals’ view about gender 
roles, gender inequality and gender stereotypes I propose that female inventors are likely to have 
more representation in firms with liberal CEOs than in firms with conservative CEOs. I tested 
these relationships by analyzing a sample of CEOs who led S&P1500 firms from 1992 to 2014 
and the results were largely consistent with my predictions. My findings show that firms with 
liberal CEOs pursue more exploratory innovations, basic research, and develop more high-
quality innovations. The results also demonstrate that female inventors have more presence in 
firms with liberal CEOs. Contrary to my predictions, I found no evidence that the presence of a 
liberal CEO increases the number of innovations or the rate of low-quality innovations 
developed by a firm. This dissertation demonstrates that the ideology of CEOs is more 
consequential for how firms pursue innovation than for how much they prioritize innovation. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
CEOs have political ideologies (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powel, & Wilcox, 2005) that 
reflect their “beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson & 
Tedin, 2003: 64). Like for many people, such beliefs constitute a central aspect of CEOs’ 
identities and influence their behavior (Burris, 2001; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). CEOs’ 
ideological beliefs often inspire them to take public stances on societal issues. For example, Jeff 
Immelt, the former CEO of General Electric, once stated that “I just think it’s insincere to not 
stand up for those things that you believe in.” (Chatterji & Toffel, 2018:51). Also, Brian 
Moynihan, the CEO of Bank of America, stated the belief that “our jobs as CEOs now include 
driving what we think is right” (Chatterji & Toffel, 2018:48). Furthermore, motivated by their 
political beliefs, CEOs often make significant personal political donations. A recent study 
(Cohen, Hazan, Tallarita, & Weiss, 2019) found that during the years 2000 through 2017 about 
89% of CEOs of S&P500 had made political donations. 
CEOs also bring their political ideologies to work and those beliefs play a critical role in 
shaping their judgments and decisions. A recent body of research in organizational sciences has 
begun to explore the implications of CEO ideology for firms. Because it is known to be “the 
single most useful and parsimonious way to classify political attitudes for more than 200 years” 
(Jost, 2006: 654), the liberal-conservative continuum has been used by researchers in this 
literature stream to conceptualize political ideology. It has been shown that CEO’s liberal or 
conservative orientation is a significant source of inter-firm heterogeneity in a number of market 
and non-market strategies such as downsizing (Gupta, Nadkarni, & Mariam, 2019), capital 
allocation to business units (Gupta, Briscoe, & Hambrick, 2018), TMT pay dispersion (Chin & 
Semadeni, 2017), financial strategy (Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014), social performance (Chin, 
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Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013) and receptivity to social activists (Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 
2014). As society becomes more polarized between adherents of liberal vs conservative 
ideologies (Saad, 2019), more research on how CEOs’ political beliefs shape their decisions 
helps scholars of strategy in their quest to answering the fundamental question of the field: Why 
do firms perform differently?  
Although the body of research on the implications of CEO political ideology has been 
illuminating, its link to innovation as “the lifeblood of corporate survival and growth” (Zahra & 
Covin, 1994: 183) has remained largely unknown (Swigart, Anantharaman, Williamson, & 
Grandey, 2020). As the central decision maker of a firm, a CEO usually has such a substantial 
role in shaping the firm’s innovation that in fact “innovation starts in the CEOs’ suite” (Berger, 
Dutta, Raffel, & Samuels, 2008: 6). In light of the recent research demonstrating that liberal or 
conservative orientation of CEOs influences their choices, I expect that it also shapes decisions 
related to innovation. 
 This dissertation particularly aims to answer the following questions: 
1) How does CEO political ideology influence a firm’s innovation outcomes?  
2) How does CEO political ideology shape a firm’s innovation strategies? 
My theorizing is grounded in research showing that liberals and conservatives have 
distinct perspectives and preferences (Jost et al., 2009). First, liberals and conservatives adhere to 
different values, with liberals tending to be more sensitive to social issues and matters regarding 
equality, diversity, social change, and the natural environment (Jost, 2006). Conservatives, on the 
other hand, are inclined to more highly value individualism, differential economic rewards, 
stability, preserving the status quo, and property rights (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 
2003). Furthermore, consistent with their values, liberals favor an approach to corporate 
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governance that seeks to balance the claims of different stakeholders, while conservatives tend to 
advocate for a governance model in which shareholders’ needs precede those of other 
stakeholders (Tetlock, 2000). Moreover, political psychologists have suggested that a relative 
preference for liberal vs conservative orientation is associated with basic psychological needs 
(Jost et al., 2003; Jost, Sterling, & Stern, 2017). On one hand, conservative ideology is associated 
with a strong need to avoid uncertainty and threat; conservative individuals prefer order and 
structure and try to mitigate potential negative outcomes when making decisions (Jost et al., 
2003). Liberals, on the other hand, have a lower need to avoid uncertainty and threat. Liberal 
orientation is associated with openness to new experiences that typically characterizes 
individuals who enjoy novelty and embrace change (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). 
Conservatives, in contrast, tend to prefer the familiar over the unfamiliar, favor tried and true 
approaches, and are resistant to change (Carney, et al., 2008). 
Given these differences, I first argue that firms with liberal CEOs tend to develop more 
innovations than those with conservative CEOs. Innovation almost always involves something 
new (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997) and is usually associated with a high risk of failure 
either during the research and development (R&D) process or later in the commercialization 
stage (Mansfield, 1968). Because liberal CEOs enjoy trying out novel and new approaches that 
are relatively risky, they are more likely to view and prioritize innovation as a valuable means 
for achieving a firm’s goals. Second, I maintain that the presence of a liberal CEO increases 
breakthrough (high-quality) and failure (low-quality) innovations, because the relatively stronger 
novelty-seeking and risk-taking characteristics of liberal CEOs is likely to prompt them to 
undertake riskier R&D projects. Such projects are often associated with the promise of a 
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remarkable payoff in form of a breakthrough innovation but also with the likelihood of complete 
failure (Cabral, 2003; Conti, 2014).  
I further postulate that the effect of CEO political ideology goes beyond outcomes of 
innovation and shapes strategies that firms pursue in their innovative endeavors. I particularly 
focus on firms’ choices between the pursuit of exploration vs exploitation strategies, firms’ 
research and development strategy (basic vs applied research), and inventor-staffing strategies. 
First, I argue that liberal CEOs are more likely than conservative CEOs to pursue exploratory 
innovation strategies. Exploratory innovations often involve searching in knowledge and 
technology domains unfamiliar to a firm and dealing with unknowns (March, 1991), thus this 
strategy is more consistent with the novelty-seeking and risk-taking characteristics of liberal 
CEOs as opposed to the familiarity and certainty-seeking attitudes of conservatives. Second, I 
maintain that innovation strategy in firms with liberal CEOs is more likely to be directed toward 
basic research than in firms with conservative CEOs. Basic research, characterized by early-stage 
research directed toward understanding of fundamental principles about a phenomenon, is often 
launched without a clear-cut practical application in mind (Nelson, 1959;1962). Such research 
often leads to creation of knowledge with no immediate commercial benefits (Rosenberg, 1990). 
Also, knowledge resulting from often long and costly basic research activities could benefit other 
firms and even rivals without their incurring the costs (Rosenberg, 1990; Trajtenberg, 
Henderson, & Jaffe, 1992), so a mere profit maximization motive often could not justify the 
pursuit of basic research (Nelson, 1959; Rosenberg, 1990). I propose that, because liberals enjoy 
novelty and discovery and have a stronger belief in social responsibility of corporations, they are 
relatively more likely to be inclined to pursue basic research. Finally, I investigated the inventor-
staffing strategies of liberal vs conservative CEOs by examining gender diversity among 
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inventors. I argue that liberal CEOs’ lower adherence to gender stereotypes, their views about 
gender roles, and their belief in the necessity of mitigating gender inequality result in a higher 
presence of female inventors in their firms and more involvement of females in innovation 
teams. 
I tested my hypotheses on a sample of S&P1500 firms and the results largely confirmed 
my predictions, i.e., the political ideology of CEOs was shown to be instrumental in shaping 
firms’ innovation outcomes as well as the trajectory of their innovations.  
This study extends the literature on executives’ political ideology, innovation, and gender 
diversity in corporate R&D in several ways. First, it contributes to the literature examining the 
implications of CEO political ideology by showing how it shapes innovation as a significant 
source of a firm’s competitive advantage and long-term performance (DiMasi, 2000; 
Schumpeter, 1942). My study demonstrates that a liberal or conservative CEO orientation is 
reflected more in the direction and trajectory of a firm’s innovation than in how much it 
prioritizes innovation. According to my findings, a CEO’s political ideology helps explain 
variations among firms with respect to innovation quality as well as understanding why different 
firms pursue different strategies in their innovative endeavors.  
Second, my study contributes to several research streams on innovation and organizational 
search. First, it adds to the body of research on the impact of CEO characteristics on innovation, 
a small but growing research stream that has demonstrated that personal characteristics of CEOs 
(e.g. temporal orientation (Nadkarni & Chen, 2014), hubris (Tang, Li, & Yang, 2015), 
narcissism, and humility (Zhang, Ou, Tsui, & Wang, 2017)) influence firms’ innovation. My 
study extends the range of CEO characteristics that shape innovation to include ideological 
beliefs. Second, my study contributes to the research stream that studies quality of innovations. 
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breakthrough innovations enable firms to revolutionize the current technological order, create 
new technological trajectories, and engage in new business development (Ahuja & Lampert, 
2001). Because of the value of such innovations, understanding their antecedents is said to be a 
noteworthy contribution to the literature (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). As another contribution, my 
study shows that CEO political ideology has a critical role in a firm’s making a choice between 
exploration vs exploitation. The literature on determinants of firms’ propensity to either explore 
or exploit mostly points to firm (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003) and environmental factors 
(Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006) while neglecting the behavioral/psychological 
determinants of the choice between these strategies (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010; Wilden, 
Hohberger, Devinney, & Lavie, 2018), and my study helps narrow this gap in the literature. 
Finally, my study contributes to the literature related to the antecedents of basic research. 
Understanding factors that may lead profit-maximizing firms to pursue basic research has been 
an important inquiry in this research stream (Rosenberg, 1990; Nelson, 1959) because firms are 
usually hesitant to conduct basic research due to concern that they might not be able to fully 
appropriate the benefit of such endeavors. My results show that novelty-seeking and liberal 
values of CEOs offset, to some extent, such appropriability concerns and serve as a factor that 
encourages basic research. 
Third, this study also contributes to the literature on gender diversity in corporate R&D. 
While prior research has shown a persistent gender imbalance in science in both academia and 
industry (Murray & Graham, 2007; Whittington, 2011; 2018), the current understanding of 
factors leading to under-representation of women in these domains is still limited (Whittington & 
Smith-Doerr, 2005, Whittington, 2018). My study advances this research stream by bringing the 
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political ideology of CEOs into the picture and illustrating CEO liberalism as a factor that can 
contribute to reduction of gender disparity in corporate R&D activities.  
  Dissertation Overview  
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a literature review of 
political ideology, beginning with an overview of the different values and psychological traits of 
people with liberal or conservative orientations. I then delve into reviewing the current research 
on implications of liberal vs conservative orientations for organizational outcomes. In Chapter 3, 
I describe my proposed theory about the influence of CEOs’ political ideology on innovation 
outcomes and strategies. Chapter 4, dedicated to methodology and results, introduces the sample, 
data-collection procedures, variables and measures, results, and supplementary tests I used to 
examine the robustness of the results. Finally, in Chapter 5, I provide a discussion of the results 
and the limitations of my study along with some suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter has two sections. In the first section, I provide an overview of political 
ideology on a liberalism-conservatism continuum and discuss the distinct values, preferences, 
and desires of individuals who adhere to these beliefs. In the second section, I review the 
literature on how the distinct characteristics of liberals and conservatives discussed in the first 
section are reflected in organizational outcomes.  
Political Ideology on Liberalism-Conservatism Continuum 
Political ideology reflects peoples’ beliefs about how a society ought to be structured and 
how to achieve such structure (Erikson & Tedin, 2003; Jost et al., 2009). An individual’s 
political ideology is usually relatively stable and enduring throughout the course of life and is an 
important aspect of life for most people (Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2009). For centuries, 
distinction between left-right or liberal-conservative has been the most useful way to 
conceptualize political ideology, and it is generalizable across countries and nationalities (Jost, 
2006; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984; Ware, 1996).  
Liberal and conservative ideologies represent systems of values that lead people to prefer 
certain states of affairs over others (Jost, 2006; Tedin, 1987). Kerlinger (1984) provides a list of 
distinct values that liberals and conservatives endorse. Liberals value “freedom of the individual, 
constitutional participatory government and democracy, the rule of law, free negotiation, 
discussion and tolerance of different views, constructive social progress and change, 
egalitarianism and the rights of minorities, secular rationality and rational approaches to social 
problems, and positive government action to remedy social deficiencies and to improve human 
welfare” (Kerlinger, 1984: 15). Liberals favor equality advancement and are sensitive to social 
issues such as diversity, environmental issues, and human rights (Jost, 2006). Conversely, 
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conservatives emphasize the uncertainty of progress and value stability and the status quo, 
religion and morality, and the natural inequality of men (Kerlinger, 1984). They also support 
conventional authority figures, the sanctity of property rights, and the importance of business in a 
society (Kerlinger, 1984). Moreover, conservatives tend to believe more in individualism and 
individual responsibility.  
Despite the wide range of value differences endorsed by liberals and conservatives, these 
differences can be summarized in three broad groups that show how they believe society should 
be structured (Jost, et al., 2003; Swigart, et al., 2020). These broad categories include: 1) how 
much an individual advocate for equality verses hierarchy, 2) how much an individual supports 
social change versus traditions, and 3) how much an individual focus on external and contextual 
factors versus personal responsibility in explaining outcomes (Jost et al., 2003; Weiner, Osborne, 
& Rudolph, 2011; Zucker & Weiner, 1993). Liberal-oriented individuals believe in the necessity 
of social change to ameliorate inequality that they believe has resulted from situational and 
contextual factors that hinder individuals from achieving their desires, while conservatives value 
preserving current traditions and hierarchical structures of their society and believe in 
individuals’ agency to achieving outcomes and changing their condition.  
Research in political psychology also shows that liberals and conservatives significantly 
differ with respect to a wide array of attributes such as dogmatism, integrative complexity, 
personal needs for order/structure/closure, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, 
cognitive/perceptual rigidity, and subjective perceptions of threat (Jost, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 
2017). Relying on these findings, political psychologists suggest that the type of political beliefs 
people embrace corresponds to their dispositional tendencies and preferences (Jost et al., 2003; 
Jost, 2017). In other words, “individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and 
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opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with 
their own psychological needs and interests” (Jost, 2017:167). Jost et al., (2003) demonstrated 
that adherence to liberal vs conservative values is associated with the need to manage 
uncertainty and threat. Specifically, conservative orientation has been shown to appeal to 
individuals who possess a strong need to reduce uncertainty and threat (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et 
al., 2017). As a result, conservatives tend to prefer the familiar versus the unfamiliar and desire 
order, structure, and predictability (Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017). They 
also strive to maintain a sense of safety and security (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017) and try to 
diminish the possibility of negative events by avoiding unknowns and sticking to tried and true 
approaches (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014). Liberal ideology, on the other hand, is appealing 
to people with less fear of uncertainty and threat. Liberals have a higher propensity to take risks 
and tend to be more receptive to change (Jost, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 2017).  
Research in neuroscience provides further support for such psychological needs of liberals 
and conservatives by demonstrating that conservative and liberal individuals have different brain 
structures. Conservative-oriented individuals have a brain structure associated with more 
sensitivity to threat and fear (a larger right amygdala), liberal individual’s brain structure is 
associated with greater tolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity (a larger anterior cingulate cortex) 
(Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011; Schreiber et al., 2013). 
Similarly, political ideology has been shown to map into two dimensions of the Big Five 
personality traits: openness to new experiences and conscientiousness (Carney et al., 2008; 
Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011). Openness has been shown to be the strongest 
personality trait that predicts political ideology (Gerber et al., 2011; Sibley, Osborne, Duckitt, 
2012). Liberal orientation tends to be positively associated with openness to new experiences 
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while conservatives tend to be low in this trait (Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2011) and score 
higher than liberals in conscientiousness (Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2011).  
In summary, political ideology involves a set of values and psychological dispositions that 
lead to certain preferences and priorities that shape decision-making in personal and 
organizational domains (Swigart, et al., 2020).  
Political Ideology and Organizations 
People bring their ideological beliefs to work (Bermiss & McDonald, 2018; Gupta, 
Briscoe, & Hambrick, 2016) and those beliefs are shown to play an important role in 
organizational outcomes. The extent to which firms’ outcomes are shaped by the political 
ideology of members across organizational levels has recently attracted the interest of 
organizational scientists. In this section, I will provide a review of this new but growing research 
stream.  
Swigart, Anantharaman, Williamson, and Grandey (2020)’s recent review of this research 
stream suggests that scholarship in this domain has been characterized by two main approaches. 
One approach is conceptualizing political ideology as an identity and examining its effect on the 
dynamics of social interactions. Specifically, the consequences of fit/similarity in political 
ideology of organizational members has attracted attention1. An example is the study carried out 
by Kim, Pantzalis, and Park (2013) that shows that diversity of political ideology in boards of 
directors2 is associated with better firm performance and lower agency costs. Another interesting 
finding of Kim et al. (2013) is that incumbent directors prefer to hire new directors with political 
                                                          
1 Political ideology as an identity also informs micro level research domain such as employee selection and 
evaluation, bias and stereotyping, team composition and team dynamics to name a few. Such research is beyond the 
scope of my dissertation and, therefore, are not reviewed here. Interested readers are referend to Swigart et al., 
(2020) for a review of the current developments in these areas.    
2 They measured board diversity with several measures of distance between political ideology of members. They 
considered ideological distance between 1) inside and outside directors, 2) outside directors and CEO, 3) inside 
directors and 4) among all board members.  
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ideologies similar to their own. Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, and Graffin (2015) further 
support this evidence by showing a positive association between the political ideology of the 
incumbent TMT and that of a new TMT member. Lee, Lee, and Nagarajan (2014) complements 
the Kim et al. (2013) research by examining the alignment of political ideology between CEOs 
and independent board members. Their results show that such alignment increases agency costs 
reflected in lower firm valuation and profitability and higher likelihood of fraud. Lee et al. 
(2014) further show that in such firms poorly performing CEOs are less likely to be dismissed 
and their compensation is less contingent on performance. They attributed these results to a 
connection shaped through similarity of political beliefs (homophily principle) that in turn 
increases acceptance and empathy and consequently reduces oversight of boards with respect to 
CEO behaviors. Other studies in this domain have looked at the fit between the political ideology 
of CEO and organizational members’ and have consistently shown that such fit increases the 
extent to which CEOs inject their ideological beliefs into their decisions. For example, a liberal 
CEO tends to allocate capital more evenly to subsidiary businesses in a predominantly liberal 
organization (Gupta et al., 2018) and decreases pay dispersion among TMT when compensation 
committee members are similarly liberal-leaning (Chin & Semadeni, 2017).  
The second approach in this research stream, however, conceptualizes political ideology 
as a set of values that affects decision-making and brings about certain organizational outcomes. 
Because my dissertation falls within this category, I will devote the rest of this section to a 
detailed review of current studies associated with this conceptualization. My review differs from 
Swigart et al. (2020) in that it has a broader scope and includes papers published in Management 
and Finance journals. Finance scholars have shown a mounting interest in this subject and have 
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made interesting contributions that must be noted if a comprehensive review of this research 
stream is desired.  
Studies in this category rely on the premise that political ideology acts as a lens through 
which people perceive and interpret situations, impacting their decisions and choices through 
“behavior channeling” and “perceptual filtering” (England, 1967). Through behavioral 
channeling, individuals consciously consider and compare different available alternatives, then 
choose the one that best fits their values (England, 1967). Through perceptual filtering, 
individuals subconsciously look for information and alternatives that suit their value system 
which consequently affect their choices and decisions (England, 1967). Thus, political ideology 
has a strong behavioral implication and ‘‘helps to explain why people do what they do’’ (Jost, 
2006: 653).  
A few papers in this research stream examine the role of the prevailing political ideology 
of organizational members. According to these studies, organizational ideology shapes outcomes 
because: 1) individuals that adhere to the prevailing beliefs behave in accordance with those 
beliefs and 2) members who do not embrace such beliefs tend to follow the predominant 
preferences to act appropriately (Gupta et al., 2016). However, majority of studies have focused 
on the political ideology of upper echelons, i.e., CEOs, top management teams (TMT), and 
boards of directors. They adopt the logic of upper-echelon theory, that an organization is a 
reflection of its top decision-makers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). According to this theory, 
executives make decisions through highly individualized lenses shaped by their experiences, 
personalities, cognitions, and values.  
Political ideology at the individual level, i.e., the CEO, and at the group level, i.e., TMT, board, 
and organization has been shown to shape a wide array of organizational outcomes. I organize 
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the examined outcomes into three categories: 1) market strategies, 2) non-market strategies3, and 
3) governance decisions. 
Figure1 summarizes the current state of scholarship on the implications of political ideology as a 
set of values for organizational outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Current State of Scholarship on the Organizational Implications of Political Ideology 
Political ideology and market strategies 
A group of studies in this category examine the financial policies of both conservative and 
liberal top executives, with some relying on the distinction between liberals and conservatives 
with respect to uncertainty avoidance and threat management preferences. For example, Hutton 
                                                          
3 Mellahi, George Frynas, Sun, & Siegel (2016) defined non-market strategy as “a firm’s concerted pattern of 
actions to improve its performance by managing the institutional or societal context of economic competition” 
(144). They also suggested that such strategies are studied in two strands of “corporate social responsibility” and 
“corporate political activity”. I used their definition and categorization to group papers to market and non-market 
strategies. 
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et al., (2014) asserts that firms led by conservative TMTs have lower levels of corporate debt, 
lower capital and R&D expenditures, fewer risky investments, and are more profitable in the 
short term. Elnahas and Kim (2017) further examined the effect of CEO political ideology on 
corporate investment decisions and found that conservative CEOs are less likely than liberals to 
engage in mergers and acquisitions, and if they engage in such actions, they try to choose less 
risky options (acquiring public firms, avoiding cash payment and earnout clauses). Elnahas and 
Kim (2017) also show that acquisitions by conservatives tend to have long-term value for firms. 
Christensen et al., (2015) show that firms with conservative TMTs are less likely to engage in 
tax-avoidance than firms with liberal TMTs; this tendency is particularly observable when 
managers are entrenched and consequently have more leeway to influence financial decisions. In 
a relevant study, Francis, Hasan, Sun, and Wu (2016) show that partisan CEOs (conservative and 
liberal) are more likely than non-partisan CEOs to engage in tax sheltering4. In contrast to 
Christensen et al., (2015), they find that among partisan CEOs, conservatives are more likely to 
engage in tax-sheltering. Francis et al., attributed this finding to conservatives’ and liberals’ 
different views about the role of government and the distribution of wealth in a society that tends 
to make conservatives the advocates of tax reduction. In another interesting finding, they showed 
that liberal CEOs tend to engage in tax reductions only when their stock-based compensation is 
sufficiently high to provide enough incentive to outweigh the influence of their values. Another 
study in this domain by DeVault and Sias (2017) shows that characteristics of securities and 
portfolios of hedge funds are influenced by the political ideologies of their key decision-makers. 
Their findings show that conservative hedge funds tend to avoid stocks with greater uncertainty 
                                                          
4 According to corporate tax literature, tax avoidance is a continuum of tax policies from less aggressive (measured 
by ETR and CETR) to more aggressive actions (tax sheltering) (Francis et al., 2016).  
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and are less likely to enter new security positions, fully exit their current positions, or adjust their 
U.S. equity market exposure.  
The tendency of liberals to egalitarianism and conservatives to proportionality was shown 
by Gupta et al., (2018) to impact capital allocations in multi-business corporations. They showed 
that liberal-leaning CEOs allocate capital to subsidiary businesses more even-handedly. CEO 
equity pay and stock ownership make this association stronger. Interestingly, such an approach 
to capital allocation is value-enhancing for firms with prevailing liberal ideologies.  
Gupta et al., (2019) examined liberal and conservative CEOs’ tendencies to downsize their 
workforce and showed that the shareholder orientation of conservative CEOs makes them more 
likely to engage in such strategy.  
Finally, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) demonstrate that mutual fund investment decisions 
are determined by the political values of their top managers. Their results show that mutual funds 
with liberal-leaning managers invest less in companies that are socially irresponsible (firms with 
low KLD scores and firms in industries such as tobacco, guns, defense, etc.).  
Political ideology and non-market strategies 
Several papers examined the intersection of political ideology and CSR. These papers 
mostly rely on distinctions between liberals and conservatives in terms of stakeholder vs 
shareholder orientation. Chin et al., (2013) found that liberal CEOs emphasize CSR more than 
their conservative counterparts, especially when they have more power relative to board 
members. This study is complemented by Gupta et al., (2019) that shows liberal CEOs more 
likely to engage in CSR efforts, specifically those who are narcissistic or extraverted, because 
CEOs with these personality traits have more discretion. DiGiuli and Kostovetsky (2014) show 
that firms with liberal-leaning internal decision-makers (CEOs, founders, and directors) and 
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external stakeholders (headquarters located in Democratic states) score higher in CSR than their 
conservative-leaning counterparts. Furthermore, liberal firms’ greater spending on CSR comes at 
the expense of future stock performance and a long-term decline in ROA. In a relevant study, 
Gupta et al., (2016) showed that CSR tends to be shaped by the political ideology of the entire 
organization. They found that organizational liberalism predicts advances in CSR, specifically in 
industries in which CSR is rare and in firms with longer-tenure CEOs and those with high 
human-capital intensity. Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar (2015) focused on the distinctions between 
liberal and conservative firms with respect to their likelihood of engaging in certain types of 
fraud and showed that liberal firms are less likely to violate civil-rights, labor, and environmental 
laws than conservative firms. Conservative firms on the other hand are less likely to be the 
subject of securities fraud and intellectual property rights violations. 
Receptivity to social activism is another non-market strategy that has been studied through 
the lens of political ideology. Briscoe et al., (2014) find that CEO liberalism positively 
influences the likelihood of LGBT employee activism, specifically when the CEO is more 
powerful and when financial performance is poor. They conclude that CEO liberalism is a signal 
of a corporate opportunity structure for social activists. In a succeeding study, Gupta and Briscoe 
(2020) showed that liberal-leaning organizations tend to concede more to activists’ demands than 
conservative-leaning organizations.  
Overall, these papers underscore the idea that a liberal orientation leads to believing in the 
interdependence of firms with their social environment as well as their responsibility to 
contribute to social betterment and protect all stakeholders. Conversely, a conservative 
orientation tends to result in a specific focus on maximizing value for shareholders and believing 
that demands of other stakeholders should not garner much of a firm’s resources.  
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The effect of liberal vs conservative-leaning on corporate political strategy has also been 
examined. Unsal, Hassan, and Zirek (2016) examined CEO political ideology and corporate 
lobbying and found that firms with conservative CEOs tend to have heavier involvement in 
lobbying and higher levels of lobbying expenditures. Their results also show that the costs of 
conservatives’ lobbying efforts are typically higher than the benefits and do not tend to create 
value for their firms.  
Political ideology and governance decisions 
The political ideologies of leaders influence how firms are governed, specifically with 
respect to top executive pay and dismissal as well as employee hiring and promotion. The effect 
of political ideology on executive pay has been studied from different angles. Chin & Semadeni 
(2017) focused on horizontal and vertical pay dispersion within TMT and found that, because of 
their adherence to egalitarian values, liberal CEOs tend to decrease horizontal total pay disparity 
among the TMT, even though such values have no effect on the vertical total pay disparity 
between CEO and TMT pay. Gupta and Wowak (2017) studied the effect of board political 
ideology on CEO pay and showed that CEOs of firms led by conservative boards receive higher 
pay and their pay is more sensitive to financial performance. This effect is ascribed to the 
internal attribution tendency of conservatives and the greater weight they attribute to the CEO 
role in delivered performance. Relying on the same logic, Shi, Connelly, Mackey & Gupta 
(2019) examined the interactional effects of board conservatism and strategic investments 
(investments in R&D, capital expenditure, and acquisitions) on the effect of financial 
performance on CEO pay. They demonstrated that conservative boards tend to bolster CEO pay 
in cases when strategic investments accompanied with good financial performance. Such boards 
do tend to reduce CEO pay when strategic investments coexist with poor performance. Graffin, 
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Hubbard, Christensen and Lee (2020) focused on CEO initial pay packages, building on the 
distinction between liberals and conservatives with respect to uncertainty avoidance to show that 
CEOs receive initial pay packages that reinforce their risk propensity. Conservative CEOs tend 
to receive less performance-based pay and liberal CEOs tend to receive higher performance-
based pay in their compensation mix. Based on these results, Graffin et al., concluded that boards 
offer similar pay packages from CEO to CEO but modify them according to CEO risk tolerance. 
They also show that liberal CEOs who receive higher performance-based pay tend to take more 
risks, but performance-based pay doesn’t tend to influence conservative CEO risk-taking. Lastly, 
Park, Boeker, & Gomulya (2020) find that conservative-leaning boards of directors are more 
likely to dismiss a CEO after misconduct, attributing this result to conservatives’ emphasis on 
personal responsibility and internal attribution and their strong tendencies to manage threat. 
These tendencies make conservative boards less tolerant of norm violation and more strongly 
reactive to a CEO who engaged in financial misconduct. 
Briscoe and Joshi (2017) build on the distinction between liberals and conservatives in 
their attributional tendencies and their different perspectives about equality to examine the effect 
of political ideology of managers on gender gap in performance-based pay. They show that the 
male-female gender gap in performance-based pay is lower in law firms led by liberal 
supervisors than in firms with conservative supervisors. Carnahan and Greenwood (2018) 
investigated the effect of manager political ideology on the hiring and promotion of females, 
drawing on liberals’ and conservatives’ different views about equality, gender roles in society, 
and leadership traits. Their results demonstrate that liberal managers of law firms, specifically 
male managers, are more likely to hire, select in work teams, and promote females.  
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My review of literature (summarized in Table 1) reveals that, while political ideology has 
been shown to impact a wide range of decisions and strategies, we still do not have a complete 
understanding about how it shapes innovation5. The lack of research integrating innovation and 
political ideology was also highlighted by Swigart et al., (2020) in their most recent review of the 
literature in the field. Although innovation is a critical determinant of competitive advantage, 
firms vary with respect to the amount of resources they invest in innovation and the extent to 
which they integrate innovation into their strategies. So, exploring the antecedents of such 
variation has been the focus of researchers across disciplines. Specifically, CEOs have been 
shown to be influential actors in shaping innovation (Nadkarni & Chen, 2014; Tang et al., 2015). 
As CEOs’ political ideologies lead them to prefer certain decisions, they may also impact how 
much CEOs emphasize innovation as a route to growth and competitive advantage.  
The following chapter elaborates on my theory related to how CEO political ideology 
influences innovation outcomes and strategies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Kashmiri and Mahajan (2017), published in the Journal of Marketing Research, showed that firms with liberal 
CEOs exhibit a higher rate of new product introductions (NPIs). My study extends their research in several ways. 
First, they specifically focused on NPIs, but my study considers a wider range of innovation strategies and outcomes 
and provides a richer picture of the effect of political ideology on innovation. Furthermore, their sample included 
421 publicly listed firms that are tracked from 2006 to 2010. My main sample includes S&P1500 firms and I track 
them from 1992 to 2014. The sample of my study spans a longer time period, and by focusing on S&P 1500 covers a 
wider set of firms that enhances the generalizability of my findings.  
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Table 1. A Summary of Research on Political Ideology and Organizational Outcomes 
 Study PI measure  Outcome of interest   Mechanism  Boundary conditions  
M
ar
k
et
 S
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
Hong & 
Kostovetsky 
(2012) 
- TMT 
liberalism  
- Investment in socially 
irresponsible firms (-) 
- Fund performance  
- Stakeholder orientation 
of liberals vs 
shareholder orientation 
of conservatives  
- 
Hutton et 
al., (2014) 
- TMT 
conservatism  
- CEO 
conservatism  
 
Financial policies: 
- Corporate debt (-) 
- Capital and R&D 
expenditure (-) 
- Risky investments (-) 
- Profitability (+) 
- Stronger need of 
conservatives to manage 
threat and avoid 
uncertainty   
- 
Christensen 
et al., 
(2015) 
- TMT 
conservatism  
- CEO 
conservatism 
- Tax avoidance (-) 
- New TMT conservatism 
(+)  
- New CEO conservatism 
(+) 
- Stronger need of 
conservatives to manage 
threat and avoid 
uncertainty 
- Homophily principle  
- TMT entrenchment 
(+) 
Francis et 
al., (2016) 
- CEO 
liberalism  
- Tax Sheltering (-) 
- Liberals values about 
distribution of wealth  
- CEO equity 
compensation (-)  
- CEO entrenchment 
(-) 
- Local community 
liberalism (+) 
 
Elnahas & 
Kim (2017) 
- CEO 
conservatism  
- M&A frequency (-) 
- Method of payment 
- Type of target (public vs 
private) 
- Short-term value 
following M&A (None) 
- Long-term value 
following M&A (+) 
- Stronger need of 
conservatives to manage 
threat and avoid 
uncertainty   
- 
DeVault & 
Sias (2017) 
Organizational 
liberalism   
- Security characteristics: 
{size (-), age (-), 
volatility (+), 
profitability (-), dividend 
paying (-) and lottery-
type securities (+)} 
- Portfolio decisions:  
{entry trades (+), exit 
trades (+), change in total 
equity holdings (+)} 
- Stronger need of 
conservatives to manage 
threat and avoid 
uncertainty   
- 
Gupta et al., 
(2018) 
- CEO 
liberalism  
- Even handedness in 
capital allocation (+) 
- Firm value (+) 
- Liberals preference for 
equality (egalitarianism) 
and conservatives 
preference for hierarchy 
(proportionality) 
- Organizational 
liberalism (+)  
- CEO equity-based 
pay (+)  
- CEO shareholding 
(+) 
Gupta et al., 
(2019) 
- CEO 
conservatism   
- Downsizing  
- Stakeholder orientation 
of liberals vs 
shareholder orientation 
of conservatives  
- CEO Extraversion 
(+) 
 
(Table 1 cont'd.) 
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 Study PI measure 
Outcome of 
interest 
Mechanism 
Boundary conditions 
N
o
n
-M
ar
k
et
 S
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
Chin et al., 
(2013) 
- CEO liberalism  - CSR (+) 
- Stakeholder orientation 
of liberals vs shareholder 
orientation of 
conservatives  
- CEO power (+) 
- Financial performance (-) 
Briscoe et 
al., (2014) 
- CEO liberalism  
- Receptivity to 
LGBTQ 
activists (+) 
- Liberals embracing 
values of equality, 
diversity and human 
rights. 
- Financial Performance (-) 
- CEO power(+) 
- Phase of the movement 
DiGiuli & 
Kostovetsky 
(2014) 
- CEO liberalism 
- Founder liberalism 
- board members 
liberalism 
- local community 
liberalism   
- CSR (+) 
- Stakeholder orientation 
of liberals vs shareholder 
orientation of 
conservatives  
-  
Hutton et 
al., (2015) 
- TMT liberalism  
- Firm liberalism  
- Local community 
liberalism   
Litigation types:  
- civil rights, 
labor, and 
environment (-) 
- securities fraud 
and intellectual 
property rights 
violations. (+) 
- liberal values of equal 
rights, labor rights, and 
environmental protection 
vs conservative values of 
free market, property 
right and limited 
government  
-  
Gupta et al., 
(2016) 
- Organizational 
liberalism  
- CSR (+) 
- Stakeholder orientation 
of liberals vs shareholder 
orientation of 
conservatives  
- Prevalence of CSR 
practices in industry (-) 
- Human capital intensity 
of firm (+) 
- CEO tenure (+) 
Unsal et al., 
(2016) 
- CEO conservatism  
- lobbying 
expenditure 
- number of bills 
and issues 
lobbied for 
- number of 
lobbyists hired   
- Firm 
performance 
- Stronger need of 
conservatives to manage 
threat and avoid 
uncertainty   
-  
Gupta et al., 
(2018) 
- CEO liberalism  - CSR (+) 
- Stakeholder orientation 
of liberals vs shareholder 
orientation of 
conservatives  
- CEO Narcissism (+) 
- CEO Extraversion (+) 
Gupta & 
Briscoe 
(2020) 
- Organizational 
liberalism  
- Receptivity to 
social activists 
(+) 
- Stakeholder orientation 
of liberals vs shareholder 
orientation of 
conservatives  
- organizational 
members’ spatial 
proximity to decision 
makers (+) 
- incongruence between 
the organization and 
community 
ideology (+) 
- incongruence between 
the organization  
and industry ideology (+) 
 
(Table 1 cont'd.) 
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 Study PI measure  
Outcome of interest   Mechanism  Boundary 
conditions  
 
Briscoe & 
Joshi 
(2017) 
- Liberal 
partnering 
supervisors 
in law firms  
- Gender gap in performance-
based pay (-) 
- External attribution 
tendency of liberals vs 
internal attribution 
tendency of 
conservatives 
- Employee 
seniority (+) 
 
Carnahan 
& 
Greenwood 
(2018) 
- Liberal 
managers in 
law firms  
- Hiring females  
- Selecting females as team 
members  
- Females promotion  
- Liberals preference for 
equality (egalitarianism) 
and conservative 
preference for hierarchy 
(proportionality) 
- Male managers 
(+) 
G
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 D
ec
is
io
n
s 
Chin & 
Semadeni  
(2017) 
- CEO 
liberalism  
- vertical pay dispersion 
between CEO and TMT (ns) 
- horizontal pay dispersion 
among TMT (+) 
- Liberals preference for 
equality (egalitarianism) 
and conservatives’ 
preference for hierarchy 
(proportionality) 
- liberalism of 
compensation 
committee  
Gupta & 
Wowak 
(2017) 
- Board 
conservatism  
- CEO pay (+) 
 
- External attribution 
tendency of liberals vs 
internal attribution 
tendency of 
conservatives  
- Conservatism of 
compensation 
committee (+) 
- financial 
performance (+) 
Kim et al., 
(2013) 
- Diversity of 
board 
members 
political 
ideology  
- New director’s political 
ideology  
- Firm performance (+) 
- Agency costs (-) 
- Homophily principle  -  
Shi, 
Connelly, 
Mackey & 
Gupta 
(2019) 
- Board 
conservatism  
- CEO performance-based pay  
- External attribution 
tendency of liberals vs 
internal attribution 
tendency of 
conservatives  
-  
Park et al., 
(2020) 
- Board 
conservatism  
- CEO dismissal after 
misconduct (+) 
- External attribution 
tendency of liberals vs 
internal attribution 
tendency of 
conservatives  
-  
Graffin et 
al., (2020) 
- New CEO 
conservatism  
- CEO initial performance-based 
pay (-) 
- Stronger need of 
conservatives to manage 
threat and avoid 
uncertainty   
-  
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
CEOs and Innovation  
As the top leader who sets the general direction of a firm, a CEO has a profound role in 
shaping innovation trajectory (Berger et al., 2008). CEOs influence innovation through a wide 
array of direct and indirect levers (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). For example, they may set explicit 
objectives and strategies for innovation or bring novel ideas and opportunities to the attention of 
other TMT members (Van de Ven, 1986). They also may make decisions about innovation 
proposals, control the amount of resources allocated to innovation projects, and coordinate the 
implementation of such projects (Augier & Teece, 2009; Van de Ven, 1986). CEOs further 
influence innovation by playing a role in designing organizational structure and developing and 
maintaining an effective organizational culture (Berson, Oreg & Dvir, 2008). Research shows 
that the extent to which CEOs prioritize innovation is a function of their personal orientations in 
terms of experiences, cognitions, personalities, and values (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984).6 For example, existing research shows that younger CEOs and those with 
engineering/R&D and sales/marketing backgrounds tend to make more investments in 
innovation than more senior CEOs and those with legal or production backgrounds (Barker & 
Mueller, 2002). Similarly, overconfidence (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh, 
2012; Tang et al., 2015), temporal orientation (Nadkarni & Chen, 2014; Yadav, Prabhu, & 
Chandy, 2007) sensation-seeking (Sunder, Sunder & Zhang, 2017), as well as humility and 
                                                          
6 There are also several attributes of CEOs’ position (e.g., power, tenure, insider vs outsider) and components of 
corporate governance (e.g., CEO compensation) that have implications for a firm’s innovation (He & Tian, 2018). 
Because those attributes are beyond the scope of my study, their effect on innovation is not reviewed here.  
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narcissism (Zhang, Ou, Tsui, & Wang, 2017) are among cognitive and personality traits that are 
shown to influence CEO attitudes toward innovation.7 
 In the section that follows, I will present my theory about the influence of CEO political 
ideology in terms of liberal-conservative orientation on several aspects of a firm’s innovation.   
CEO Political Ideology and Innovation  
CEOs bring their political ideology to the C-suites (Cohen et al., 2019; Francia et al., 
2005). Those deeply held beliefs that guide CEOs when making strategic decisions (Briscoe et 
al., 2014; Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2018) and likely to influence their decisions about 
innovation.  
Effect on the quantity of innovations   
Innovation has two core aspects that make it amenable to be influenced by a CEO’s 
political ideology: 1) newness and 2) riskiness. First, the essence of innovation is newness 
(Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997; Gupta, Tesluk, & Taylor, 2007) because it involves 
creating, accepting, and implementing new ideas related to processes, products, and technologies 
(Thompson, 1965). In a content analysis of 60 definitions of innovation, Baregheh, Rowley, & 
Sambrook (2009) concluded that “new” is the attribute most used by researchers across 
disciplines to describe innovation. To successfully innovate, firms must constantly explore new 
opportunities and experiment with new ideas (Dyer, Gregersen, & Christensen, 2011). 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, liberal orientation tends to be associated with 
openness to new experiences (Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2011). This trait characterizes 
individuals who are imaginative, curious, and amenable to new ideas, experiences, and 
unconventional perspectives (McCrae, 1987; McCrae & John, 1992). Open individuals are 
                                                          
7 A brief summary of research on the effects of CEOs’ personal orientations on innovation is provided in the 
Appendix (table A.1).  
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interested in finding new ways of doing things and tend to make change in the existing orders 
(McCrae, 1987). By contrast, conservatives tend to be low in openness and high in 
conscientiousness (Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2011). They prefer the familiar, routine, 
and tried to the unfamiliar, novel and new (Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991; Jost et al., 2003). 
Conservatives are also less likely to favor changing the status quo, coming up with new ways of 
doing things, or soliciting new information (Feist, 1998). These differences make it likely that 
liberal CEOs, more than their conservative counterparts, favor generating and experimenting 
with new ideas to develop novel technology and new products.  
Second, innovation is risky. The eventual outcome of innovation is highly uncertain; while 
some innovation projects end in success, a great number of them fail during the process. Costs 
associated with innovation is the issue that makes such uncertainty even more hazardous. Not 
only it usually takes a long time for an inventor to find a new idea and develop it to a new 
product or technology, but this process most often requires making substantial financial 
investments. For example, a recent study (Wouters, McKee & Luyten, 2020) estimated that 
between 2009 and 2018 the mean investment that biopharma companies made in R&D to 
develop new medicines was $1336 million, with a median investment of $985 million. As 
another example, in 2012 the average R&D costs for launching a new product in the consumer-
packaged goods industry was about $71 million (Cecere, 2013). Added to these costs is the 
opportunity cost of lost returns due to diverting resources from activities with potential for short-
term payoff and allocating them to innovation projects instead. In addition, pursuing innovation 
may jeopardize CEOs’ career and wealth if the failure of such efforts is attributed to their 
leadership capabilities (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985).  
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As previously discussed, conservatives and liberals tend to be different in their need to 
manage uncertainty and threat, with conservatives scoring higher with respect to such needs. 
This tendency makes conservatives strive to increase the predictability of events and enhance 
security. Conservatives are also more attuned to negative events and try to mitigate their 
possibility by avoiding unknowns and remaining loyal to the tried and true (Hibbing et al., 2014). 
Research shows that, even when thinking about the advantageous and disadvantageous of 
deviation from known approaches, conservatives tend to see the potential drawbacks more 
damaging than they see the potential benefits pleasant (Joel, Burton & Plaks, 2014). This 
evidence further demonstrates conservatives’ fearfulness of negative outcomes. Conversely, 
liberals tend to have a lower need to reduce uncertainty and threat, making them more willing to 
explore the unknown and take risks (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017). Like in any decision that 
involves risk, a person who focuses on the bright side and potential benefits is more likely to take 
a risk than one who focuses on the dark side and the potential threat. Therefore, liberal CEOs are 
more likely to look at the bright side of innovation as a strategy that brings about growth and 
profitability. Conservative CEOs, on the other hand, are more likely to look at the dark side of 
innovation as a costly strategy that may possibly jeopardize resources and profitability. 
Considering the distinction between liberals and conservatives with respect to attitudes 
toward new experiences and risk-taking, I expect that firms with liberal CEOs develop more 
innovations than firms with conservative CEOs.  
Accordingly, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1: CEO political liberalism is positively associated with the quantity of 
innovations. 
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Effect on the quality of innovations: breakthroughs vs failures    
Innovations vary with respect to the value they create for firms and the impact they have 
on markets and technology. On the one hand, breakthrough innovations are high-quality 
innovations that create considerable firm and social value (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005) by 
challenging the existing technological and competitive order, shaping new trajectories, and 
allowing firms to create new market opportunities (Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Marsh, 2006). 
Such innovations can thus be important sources of competitive advantage and positively 
influence a firm’s long-term survival. On the other hand, failures are low-quality innovations that 
create little or no value for the innovative firm (Lee, Kim, & Bae, 2020; Singh & Fleming, 
2020). 
Research shows that breakthrough and failure innovations partly result from undertaking 
high-risk R&D projects (Cabral, 2003; Conti, 2014; Lee et al., 2020). In general, taking more 
risk increases the likelihood of both favorable and unfavorable outcomes (March & Shapira, 
1987; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), so high-risk R&D increases the variance in innovation 
outcomes and the likelihood of developing innovations with extreme quality. High-risk R&D can 
obviously be a double-edged sword for firms.  
The distinctive values and psychological needs of liberals and conservatives is likely to 
influence the quality of innovations developed under their leadership. Liberal CEOs with higher 
tendencies to try out new things and enjoy novelty, as well as being willing to take more risks, 
are more likely to undertake high-risk R&D projects, while the uncertainty and threat-avoidant 
attributes of conservatives make them more cautious of launching R&D projects that may be end 
up producing negative results. Thus, conservative CEOs are more likely to opt for committing 
resources to safer R&D projects.  
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 Considering the predicted differences between liberal and conservative CEOs’ with 
respect to the riskiness of R&D projects they are willing to pursue, I suggest the following:  
Hypothesis 2: CEO political liberalism is positively associated with breakthrough 
innovations.  
Hypothesis 3: CEO political liberalism is positively associated with failure innovations.  
Effect on the strategy of innovation: exploration vs exploitation    
Firms follow different directions in developing innovation, some pursue “exploration of 
new possibilities” while others follow “exploitation of old certainties” (March, 1991:71). Put 
differently, firms’ innovation strategy varies on an explorative-exploitative continuum (Lavie, 
Stettner & Tushman, 2010; Manso, 2011).8 Exploratory innovation strategy is different from 
exploitative strategy in a number of respects. First, an exploratory innovation strategy can 
involve experimentation, a distant search for new knowledge beyond a firm’s current knowledge 
base, and a shift to a different technological trajectory (Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; 
Levinthal & March, 1993). Conversely, an exploitative innovation strategy comprises a local 
search in the proximity of the existing knowledge and building on an existing technological 
trajectory (Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; Levinthal & March, 1993). Second, exploratory 
innovations usually take a longer time to develop and pay off, require a large amount of 
resources, and are associated with greater uncertainty and higher likelihood of failure (March, 
1991). In contrast, exploitative innovations are more proximate and predictable, are less resource 
                                                          
8 In his seminal paper, March (1991) conceptualizes exploration and exploitation as a unidimensional construct. He 
believes exploration and exploitation are fundamentally incompatible for several reasons:1) because they compete 
for scarce resources, allocating resources to one strategy leaves fewer resources for another, 2) both are self-
reinforcing and initiating one may lead to continuation of its pursuit and 3) the mindset and organizational routines 
needed for each are fundamentally different. While a considerable body of research has followed March’s 
conceptualization, there are a group of studies that model exploration and exploitation as orthogonal constructs (e.g., 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar, 2003) that can be pursued simultaneously (ambidextrously). In my study, I follow 
March (1991) and consider exploration-exploitation a continuous construct.   
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intensive, and are associated with higher chances of success (March, 1991). Moreover, 
exploratory innovation leads to building new capabilities, offering radically new products, and 
entering to or creating new markets (He & Wong, 2004; March, 1991), while exploitative 
innovation results in re-using and fine-tuning current capabilities, refinement and extension of 
existing products, and meeting the demand of existing markets (Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; 
March, 1991). 
CEOs set the strategy of innovation by making strategic decisions with respect to the 
amount of R&D expenditures or the priority of different innovation projects (Custódio, Ferreira, 
Matosc, 2019; Galasso & Simcoe, 2011). As discussed earlier, exploratory innovations can 
involve recombination of new knowledge unfamiliar to the firm and a great deal of uncertainty 
about the process and potential outcomes. Because liberals tend to be open to new experiences 
and enjoy the discovery of novelty, they are likely to be more willing and able to think about 
ideas that challenge the status quo (McCrae, 1987; McCrae & John, 1992). Exploratory 
innovations are likely to be more stimulating for liberals than exploitative innovations. 
Moreover, the lower need to avoid uncertainty and the lower fear of failure associated with 
liberal orientation further reinforces their novelty-seeking and make them more tolerant of the 
risk involved in exploratory innovations. Conversely, conservatives tend to not favor novelty and 
prefer familiarity and predictability. Furthermore, relatively risk-averse conservatives tend to 
choose the safer option (Elnahas, & Kim, 2017), and the degree of uncertainty and high risk of 
failure associated with exploratory innovations is likely to exceed conservative CEOs’ risk 
tolerance.  
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Consequently, I expect liberal CEOs to be more willing to follow an exploratory 
innovation strategy, and equivalently conservative CEOs to be more willing to pursue an 
exploitative innovation strategy.  
Formally, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 4: CEO political liberalism is positively associated with exploratory 
innovations.  
Effect on the strategy of innovation: basic vs applied research     
A critical source of firms’ innovation is their research endeavors, because through 
research firms create knowledge that will be utilized to develop new products and technology 
(Arrow 1962; Nelson, 1959). Research activities can be broadly categorized as either basic or 
applied. According to National Science Foundation (NSF) basic research involves a “systematic 
study to gain more comprehensive knowledge or understanding of the subject under study 
without specific applications in mind,” while applied research involves a “systematic study to 
gain knowledge or understanding to meet a specific, recognized need.” In other words, basic 
research is early stage research that seeks general advancement of knowledge with no specific 
commercial objectives, while applied research seeks more specific knowledge creation with 
explicit commercial applications.  
Basic research initiatives are more likely than applied research to result in revolutionary 
technological advances and open new trajectories of research (Aghion & Howitt, 1996; Nelson, 
1959). This is because basic research not tied to a specific application allows the researcher to 
experiment and change the direction of research over time, in turn increasing the likelihood of 
groundbreaking discoveries (Nelson, 1959). Basic research fuels a firm’s innovation by 
extending its knowledge stock and increasing its awareness of technological advances (Henard & 
 
32 
 
McFadyen, 2005). Such knowledge serves as a key input to applied research projects aiming at 
developing new products/technology (Czarnitzki & Thorwarth, 2012), so basic research is an 
essential component of a firm’s innovation and success (Griliches, 1986; Mansfield, 1980).  
The output of basic research does not have immediate and specific practical application 
and is usually in the form of knowledge with broad application. Such knowledge has the 
potential to create value if it is assimilated and exploited in other more applied research projects. 
A firm that invests in basic research may not be able to capture the full value created by such 
research if it lacks the necessary resources or capabilities (Rosenberg, 1990). Therefore, basic 
research is difficult to appropriate (Trajtenberg et al., 1992). A factor that exacerbates the 
appropriability problem is the nature of knowledge as a public good that when produced 
becomes freely available to everyone (Rosenberg, 1990). Research shows that basic research 
spills over within the innovative firm’s industry as well as across industries (Czarnitzki & 
Thorwarth, 2012), so it is believed that the social returns of basic research tend to be higher than 
its private returns (Rosenberg, 1990). Furthermore, firms, including rivals, that did not make any 
contribution to the knowledge production process may free ride on a firm’s innovative endeavors 
and exploit the new knowledge to their benefit. Adding to this dilemma is the fact that the output 
of a basic research project is not always patentable (Rosenberg, 1990). Because of these 
characteristics, a profit-maximizing business may be reluctant to allocate resources to basic 
research because the expected private revenue produced by such efforts may not exceed their 
costs. Thus, motives other than profit maximization may be required to push firms toward 
undertaking basic research (Nelson, 1959). I suggest that a CEO’s political ideology is likely to 
be influential in a firm’s decision to pursue basic research.  
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Conservatives place high emphasis on ownership rights and believe that shareholders’ 
claims precede all others and resources need to be efficiently allocated to maximize shareholder 
wealth (Tetlock, 2000). Conservative CEOs are therefore less likely to favor shifting resources to 
research endeavors that do not promise clear practical benefits and whose returns are not 
completely appropriable. Such CEOs are less likely to favor advancement of knowledge without 
tangible applications and benefits for their own firms and shareholders. The fact that other firms, 
specifically rivals, may also benefit from investments an innovative firm made in basic research 
adds to the unfavourability of such research for conservatives. On the other hand, liberal CEOs 
take a broader view about the purpose and role of firms within a society that is reflected in their 
attempts to maintain balance among the claims of multiple stakeholders (Briscoe et al., 2014; 
Chin et al., 2013). Liberals are also likely to be more motivated toward exploring and trying out 
new things, making them more likely to favor knowledge creation and advancement, and their 
stakeholder model of corporate governance also makes them perceive the social benefits of 
conducting basic research more favorably than conservatives. Liberal CEOs are therefore 
expected to envision more promising consequences from undertaking basic research than 
conservative CEOs. Accordingly, I make the following prediction: 
Hypothesis 5: CEO political liberalism is positively associated with a firm’s engagement 
in basic research.   
Effects on gender diversity of inventors 
Over the past several years, the number of females in Science, Technology, Engineering 
and Mathematics (STEM) fields has grown. For example, in the U.S. the number of women 
granted STEM degrees increased by 48% between 2008 and 2016 (Duffin, 2019). Despite these 
great strides, there is still a remarkable universal gender gap in STEM in an array of aspects such 
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as workforce participation, salary and the distribution of positions, resources, and rewards (Hoisl 
& Mariani, 2017; Whittington, 2018). Women are particularly under-represented in inventive 
jobs (Milli, et al., 2016); in 2016, only 21% of U.S. patents listed at least one female inventor 
(USPTO, 2019) and women filled only 29.3% of R&D jobs worldwide (UNESCO, 2019). 
Moreover, research shows that female scientists obtain fewer patents than men (Naldi, 
Luzi,Valente, Parenti, 2004; Whittington, 2018) and are less likely to engage in commercial 
activities such as licensing (Duque et al., 2005), consulting (Gaughan & Corley, 2010), and 
serving on scientific advisory boards (Ding et al., 2013).  
Such a gender gap is not a matter of work quality, because research has demonstrated that 
the quality of female inventions is the same or better than that of their male counterparts 
(Whittington & Smith-Doerr, 2005). Interviews with female scientists show that in general 
women receive fewer invitations for collaboration in commercial activities and feel less sought 
by industry (Murray & Graham, 2007). This disparity in representation of females in inventive 
jobs may partly stem from gender biases and stereotypes that persist in the society (Correll, 
Benard, & Paik, 2007; Haines, Deaux, & Lofaro, 2016; Hoisl & Mariani, 2017; Long & Fox, 
1995).  
In the context of inventive jobs, the following biases may underlie the observed 
underrepresentation of women. First, innovation by nature is associated with considerable risk. 
Not only the process of research is highly uncertain, but the final invention may not result in a 
marketable product. The more novel the invention idea and the more explorative the process, the 
higher the risk of undertaking the innovation project. Since women are shown to be generally 
less risk taking than men (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Palvia, Vahamaa, & Vahamaa, 2015), female 
scientists may be perceived as unfit for jobs that require high risk-taking propensity. It may also 
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be perceived that if a female inventor is hired, she may prefer to do more routine and 
administrative R&D tasks rather than engage in cutting-edge and challenging projects. Second, 
innovation requires constant generation of new ideas and experimentation, requiring an inventor 
to stay up to date or even ahead of the latest knowledge and technological advances in his/her 
field of research. The challenging process of innovation also requires significant commitment of 
time and energy to a project to achieve the expected results, but existing views about the family-
oriented role of females may create a hurdle for female inventors in exhibiting their potential. It 
may be perceived that family commitments decrease women’s productivity because they need to 
divide their energy between work and family (Becker, 1985). Thus, some employers may believe 
that these preferences may make female scientists unable to keep their knowledge and skills 
current and devote enough time and energy to innovation projects. Such implicit assumptions 
may make employers reluctant to hire female inventors.  
As top decision-makers, CEOs have substantial influence in managing diversity in their 
firms, and their diversity-related decisions are likely to be highly influenced by their own values 
(Ng & Sears, 2012; 2020). Because liberal and conservative CEOs have dissimilar attitudes 
toward gender stereotypes, gender roles in the family, and gender inequality, I suggest that they 
also may have different views about the appointment of female scientists.  
First, conservatives are more likely than liberals to adopt gender stereotypes (Jost et al., 
2009). According to research in social-cognition, people adhere to stereotypes to enact order and 
structure to the social world and conserve their mental resources (Moskowitz, 2005). Because 
conservative orientation is associated with a stronger need to avoid uncertainty and achieve 
order, structure, and closure (Jost et al. 2003; Jost et al., 2017), stereotyping attitudes are more 
appealing to conservatives than to liberals who tend to have lower levels of such needs (Jost et 
 
36 
 
al., 2009). As a result, conservative CEOs are more likely to perceive the gender of females as a 
proxy for their risk-aversion and consequently their unsuitability for the job. The lower 
likelihood of adherence to stereotypes makes liberal CEOs less prone to perceive a scientist’s 
gender as an indicator of congruity/incongruity with the job. Second, conservatives in general 
tend to hold a more traditional view of family roles and gender norms (Jost et al., 2009), 
believing that women’s priorities are looking after the family and raising children, not working 
outside home (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Conversely, liberals often 
hold non-traditional views about the role of women in the family and even may perceive 
women’s working inside home as an indicator of inequality (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Davis 
& Greenstein, 2009). Because liberals are less likely to believe that a women’s job is looking 
after home and family, such CEOs are expected to be less concerned that females may miss work 
or have lower productivity due to family commitments.  
Conservatives and liberals also have distinct attitudes toward equality and social change 
(Jost et al., 2003, Jost et al., 2009). While conservatives advocate for stability and hierarchy, 
liberals prefer social change and equality (Jost et al., 2003, Jost et al., 2009). Under-
representation of females in scientific jobs is likely to be perceived by liberal CEOs as an 
instance of injustice because this situation may deprive them of the opportunity to demonstrate 
their capabilities (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999). Therefore, liberals are more likely to believe 
that such social problem should be addressed, suggesting that liberal CEOs are more likely than 
conservative CEOs to evaluate female job candidates more positively and be more willing to 
employ them.    
Although CEOs may not be directly involved in the process of selecting and hiring 
inventors, their diversity preferences may influence this process. CEOs set the general principles 
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of human resource management, including those related to gender equality that become the basis 
for policies and practices implemented by lower-level managers (Steffensen, Parker, Wang, & 
Ferris, 2019). CEOs may also explicitly engage in pro-diversity behavior or communicate their 
own preferences about gender equality to other TMT members (Ng & Sears, 2020). Perception 
of a CEO’s commitment to equality make it more likely that TMT and other managers factor it 
into their selection decisions (Chadwick, Super, & Kwon, 2015; Fenton-O’Creevy, 2001). 
Therefore, the political ideology of CEOs can influence the degree of representation of female 
scientists in their firms.  
Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: CEO political liberalism is positively associated with female inventors’ 
representation in a firm.  
The political ideology of CEOs is likely to not only influence the overall representation of 
female scientists in firms, but females’ presence in innovation teams. As discussed earlier, liberal 
CEOs are more likely than their conservative counterparts to believe that organizations should 
act to resolve inequality as a social problem (Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2013), so they are 
more likely to include gender equality preferences in their general principles and communicate 
them to other TMT members so that such principles will be integrated into their firm’s policies 
and practices. Moreover, liberal CEOs may encourage equality values by shaping an 
organizational climate that illuminates for other organizational members precisely what 
behaviors are acceptable. As a result, it would be expected that the perception of a CEO’s view 
about female scientists and their commitment to gender equality would cause managers and 
employees in a firm led by a liberal CEO to have a more positive evaluation of female inventors 
and a stronger adherence to mitigation of the likelihood of inequality in their decisions. In such a 
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context, those individuals that do not necessarily adhere to the value of gender equality are likely 
to behave in accordance to the prevailing values encouraged by the CEO in order to behave 
appropriately and avoid possible undesirable consequences for themselves (March & Olsen, 
2006). Therefore, in a firm led by a liberal CEO, female scientists are more likely to be selected 
for participation in innovation projects because in such firms there is a positive perception of 
female scientists’ competence and enhanced sensitivity about provision of equal opportunities 
for females.   
As such, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 7: CEO political liberalism is positively associated with female inventors’ 
representation in innovation teams.  
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
Sample  
I began with all CEOs who had served in firms listed in the S&P1500 (available on 
ExecuComp) during 1992-2014, which included 7455 CEOs across 3733 firms. S&P1500 as the 
main sample fit the purpose of my study for several reasons. First, the S&P1500 covers 
approximately 90% of the United States market capitalization and involves an array of small, 
midsize, and large public companies across different industries and states, thus supporting the 
generalizability of the findings. Second, because of the visibility of S&P1500 firms, data about 
their CEOs are readily available, facilitating the measurement of CEO-related variables. I chose 
1992 as the starting year because this is the first year that ExecuComp data is available. I chose 
2014 as the end point because the main source I used to measure CEO political ideology is 
available up to then and the dataset I used to match ExecuComp firms with patent data is available 
up to 2015. Following prior research (Custódio et al., 2019; Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer 
et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2020; Sunder et al., 2017), I excluded financial (SIC codes 6000–6999) and 
transportation and utilities firms (SIC codes 4000–4999) from my sample because they are less 
likely to have significant patenting activity. I also excluded all CEOs for whom I found no donation 
to either Democratic and/or Republican parties between 1992 to 2014. I also considered only those 
firms listed in Execucomp that match with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) database. In other words, I only included firms in the intersection of the USPTO and the 
S&P15009. Finally, I excluded companies incorporated outside the U.S.  
                                                          
9 Previous studies usually assigned zero to those firms for which no match is found in patent database. In other 
words, they assigned zero patents to a firm-year observation either because the focal firm was not found in patent 
database or had zero patent applications in the focal year. As underscored by some recent studies (Balsmeier, 
Fleming, & Manso, 2017), this operationalization increases the measurement error although it leads to a larger 
sample size. In my study, to have a more accurate sample, I excluded not-matched firms.    
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Imposing these screens resulted in a final sample size of 9776 firm-year that covers 1544 
CEOs across 959 firms and 39 different industries (at two digits SIC codes).  
Data 
I used patent data obtained from USPTO’s PatentsView database to measure innovation 
variables10. This platform is built on a newly developed database that longitudinally links 
inventors, their organizations, their locations, and their overall patenting activity. It uses data 
derived from USPTO bulk data files that covers all patents granted from 1976 to the most recent 
update. I matched each assignee’s id of patent data (the time-invariant identifier provided by 
USPTO to firms) with Compustat’s company unique identifier code (GVKEY) following the 
name-matching algorithm and dataset made publicly available by Arora, Belenzon, and Sheer 
(2017)11. Using Arora et al., (2017)’s dataset, Compustat firms can be matched with patent data 
produced between 1980 and 2015. This procedure resulted in a matched list of GVKEYs and 
assignee ids that I then used to collect the required patent data for each firm in my sample. I 
matched patents to firm-year observations using patents’ filing (application) dates. As previously 
mentioned, in my final sample I included only those GVKEYs for which I could find a match on 
the PatentsView database. While some prior studies assigned zero patents to those firms not 
matched with patent data, this practice is likely to increase measurement error (Balsmeier, et al., 
2017). I also used the dataset made publicly available by Marx and Fuegi (2020)12 to measure the 
Citations to science variable. This dataset contains approximately 22 million citations to scientific 
papers by both U.S. patents (from 1947 to 2018) and non-U.S. patents (from 1782 to 2018).  
                                                          
10 This data is available on http://www.patentsview.org/download. 
11 This database is available on https://zenodo.org/record/3594743#.Xvt4Zm1KjIX 
12 This dataset is available on https://zenodo.org/record/3755799#.Xw3a_G1KjIV 
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To measure CEO political ideology, I used individuals’ listed donations to Democratic and 
Republican parties. I obtained data about such donations from Bonica’s 2016 Database on 
Ideology, Money in Politics and Elections (DIME)13 that includes data on political donations to 
candidates, party committees, and political action committees (PACs) between 1979 and 2014. 
This dataset contains more than 130 million political contributions made by organizations and 
individuals collected from Federal Election Commission (FEC) filings.  
I obtained financial data and information on firm locations from Compustat, and 
institutional ownership data from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database. 
While I obtained most CEO data from ExecuComp, I accessed data on CEO Vega from the updated 
version of the database made available by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). This dataset includes 
data on CEO Vega between 1992 and 201414.  
Measures 
Dependent variables 
Quantity of innovations. I measured the quantity of innovations as the number of patents 
filed by a firm to USPTO in each sample-year (Custódio et al., 2019; Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; 
Sunder et al., 2017). A patent for an invention is the grant of property rights to its inventor to 
exclude/stop others from making, using, selling or importing the invention for a limited time (20 
years) in exchange for publishing and enabling public disclosure of it. Patents are extensively 
used in literature as a measure of a firm's innovation-related activities (Ahuja, 2000).   
Breakthrough innovations. Breakthroughs are high-quality innovations. Following the 
innovation literature (Lahiri, 2010), to determine the quality of innovation I used the number of 
                                                          
13 This dataset is available on https://data.stanford.edu/dime 
14 This dataset is available on https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/ 
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forward citations (citations made by future patents to a given patent) that a patent received in 
subsequent years after being filed. Patent citations are a credible measure of innovation quality 
for several reasons (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). First, when firms cite a patent, it reveals 
an intent to invest in further development of the innovation/knowledge disclosed by that patent, a 
signal that the cited patent is technologically/economically important. Since citations accrue over 
time when the uncertainty about the value of an innovation is reduced, receiving citations years 
after being granted is a signal of a patent’s value. Consistent with these arguments, research 
shows that the number of citations a patent receives can positively affect a firm’s value (Hall, et 
al., 2005; Trajtenberg, 1990). To measure breakthrough innovations, I divided the number of 
forward citations received (up to year 2019) by each patent applied by a firm in a given year by 
the average of all forward citations received by all patents filed in the same technological class in 
that year (Azoulay, GraffZivin, & Manso, 2011). I categorized those patents in the top 1 
percentile of the received citations as breakthrough innovations and considered the number of 
breakthrough innovations filed by a firm in each sample year for testing my models.  
Failure innovations. Failures are low-quality innovations. Using the number of citations as 
the proxy of a patent’s quality (Lahiri, 2010), I measured failures as those patents that received 
no forward citations (zero citations) in subsequent years (up to 2019) after being filed (Balsmeier 
et al., 2017; Singh & Fleming, 2010). 
Exploratory innovations. I measured exploratory innovations in two different ways. First, 
as a basis for determining whether a patent is exploratory, I focused on the extent to which a 
patent builds on knowledge that is unfamiliar/new to a firm (Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003). 
To this end, I examined backward citations of a patent. When filing a patent to USPTO, the 
applicant is obliged to report prior art (i.e., references) on which the patent relied. After a patent 
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is filed, an examiner, an expert in the relevant technology domain, further explores the prior art 
relevant to the patent and adds the required additional references. This list makes up the 
backward citations made by a patent. I classified a backward citation as representing new 
knowledge if it is neither a self-citation (citation to a patent owned by the focal firm) nor a 
repeated citation (citation to a patent that is already cited by the focal firm’s previous patents).15 I 
then defined a given patent as an exploratory patent if more than 90% of its backward citations 
represent new knowledge (Lee et al., 2020). I used the total number of such patents filed by a 
firm in each sample year for hypothesis testing and gathered them under the title of new 
knowledge. As the second measure of explorative innovation, I focused on the extent to which a 
firm explores in new technological domains (new technology). To this end, I examined the 
technology class of patents filed by a firm in each year and coded a patent’s technology class as 
1 if the focal firm had no previous patents in that class within the last 5 years (Conti, 2014; Lee 
et al., 2020). I used the total number of new technology classes a firm had during each sample-
year for hypothesis testing. 
Engagement in basic research. I used two proxies to operationalize this variable.16 The 
first proxy was the number of backward citations made by a firm’s patents to scientific papers 
(Citations to science). Backward citations listed on a patent can be made either to other patents 
or to none-patent sources. While patents tend to represent more applied innovations, scientific 
papers include more basic and non-commercial knowledge (Marx & Fuegi, 2020). In the U.S., 
                                                          
15 In determining whether a backward citation is a self-citation and/or a repeated citation, I considered the exact day 
of patent application rather than the year of application. This way, the backward citations of a given patent were 
examined in relation to the pool of patents filed/cited by the focal firm up to the day before the day in which it is 
filed. This more stringent operationalization of exploratory innovation more accurately represents the newness of 
knowledge involved in a patent.  
 
16 While a better way to operationalize, basic research would be to examine the composition of firms’ R&D 
expenditures, such data are not readily available from databases such as Compustat and would require surveys 
and/or interviews. 
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approximately half of the basic research (48%) is performed by higher-education institutions 
(Khan, Robbins, & Okrent, 2020) and their results are usually published in scientific papers. A 
patent’s citations to scientific papers tends to show the extent to which it relies on basic rather 
than applied research (McMillan, Narin, & Deeds, 2000). Furthermore, to build on basic research 
described in scientific papers, a firm itself would need to have some capability/prior investments 
in conducting basic research (Rosenberg, 1990); otherwise, the firm most likely cannot exploit 
the new knowledge or appreciate the value of such knowledge in the first place (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Henard & Ann McFadyen, 2005). Thus, the extent to which a firm cites 
scientific papers could serve as a proxy of how close to basic research is its approach to 
innovation. Marx and Fuegi (2020) developed a dataset that includes up to 93% of backward 
citations to scientific papers made by filed patents. Using this dataset, I identified the backward 
citations to scientific papers and used the total number of such citations made by patents filed by 
the firms in each sample year for hypothesis testing. The second proxy I used to operationalize a 
firm’s approach to basic research is the number of its patents funded by the government. The 
U.S. government has provided most funds allocated to basic research since World War II 
(Nelson, 1959; Rosenberg, 1990). For example, in 2017 the federal government was the largest 
funder of basic research, providing nearly 42% of such funding (Khan et al., 2020). The 
PatentsView database provides a list of patents funded by government agencies such as the 
Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, the Department of Defense, the 
National Institute of Health, etc. I used this list and identified all patents filed by a firm in a 
sample year funded by the government, then used the total number of such patents in the 
hypothesis-testing models.  
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Female inventors’ representation in firms. Each patent lists all the inventors that 
contributed to its development and the PatentsView database has recently begun providing 
information about inventor gender.17 Using this data, I first identified the gender of all inventors 
listed in patents filed by a firm in a sample-year, then divided the total number of female 
inventors by the total number of inventors in each sample year and entered the resulting ratios in 
the hypothesis-testing models.  
Female inventor representation in innovation teams. I defined innovation teams as those 
inventors listed on a given patent. For each team (each patent), after identifying the gender of 
inventors, I calculated the ratio of female inventors, then averaged this ratio for all patents filed 
by a firm in a given year and entered the resulting ratios in the hypothesis-testing models.  
Independent variable 
CEO liberalism. Following previous studies (Chin et al., 2013, Gupta et al., 2018), I used 
individual donations to Democratic and Republican parties to measure CEO political ideology. 
Individual personal donations to candidates and parties account for a significant portion of 
money in American politics; for example, in 2008 individual donations accounted for over 90 
percent of all campaign contributions (Fremeth, Kelleher Richter & Schaufele, 2013). The share 
of Americans who donate to political candidates is also increasing; while in 1992 only 6% of 
Americans reported making political donations, this number rose to 12% in 2016 (Hughes, 
2017).  
Political science research shows that individual donations to political parties tend to be 
ideologically motivated (Ansolabehere, deFigueiredo, & Snyder, 2003), and it is widely accepted 
that people with liberal values generally support Democrats and conservative-oriented 
                                                          
17 The methodology used by USPTO to identify inventors’ gender is accessible in the following link: 
http://data.patentsview.org/documents/On-line+Appendix+-+Gender+Attribution+of+USPTO+Inventors.pdf 
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individuals favor Republicans (Levendusky, 2009; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 1984). 
Donations to Democratic and Republican parties have therefore been extensively used in the 
literature as a proxy for measuring individual political ideology. 
In calculating this variable, I considered political ideology to be time-invariant, an 
operationalization consistent with research in political psychology showing that when individuals 
reach adulthood their political ideology remains stable (Jost, 2006; Sears & Funk, 1999). 
Moreover, recent studies on executives’ political ideology provide further evidence about the 
consistency of executives’ ideological orientation (and contributions) over time (Chin et al., 
2013; Christensen et al., 2015, Gupta & Wowak, 2017). The dataset of S&P1500 CEOs’ political 
ideology I developed in this study is, to my knowledge, the most comprehensive dataset (in 
terms of the number of CEOs and the variety of firms covered) developed so far in this research 
stream. I tracked the donations made by all S&P1500 CEOs (7455 CEOs) from 1992 to 2014, 12 
election cycles. Considering donations over such a long period increases the reliability of the 
measurement of CEO political ideology.  
To find political contributions made by sample CEOs, I matched the self-reported first 
name, middle name, last name, employer name, job title and locations on the Bonica dataset to 
CEO data in Execucomp. I then manually inspected all the matched records and disregarded 
ambiguous or incorrect matches, finding as a result a total of 174,694 donations made by 4470 
CEOs who lead S&P1500 companies from 1992 to 2014. Over these 12 cycles, among those 
CEOs that made political donations, about 9% donated exclusively to Democrats and 23% 
donated exclusively to Republicans while the rest donated to both parties. Following prior 
studies (Chin et al., 2013, Gupta et al., 2018), I measured CEO liberalism using an index of four 
indicators of political liberalism: 1) proportion of the number of donations to the Democratic 
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Party to the number of donations to both parties, (2) proportion of the number of years the 
individual donated to the Democratic Party to the number of years he or she donated to either 
party, (3) proportion of the amount of donations to the Democratic Party to the amount of 
donations to both parties, and (4) proportion of the number of unique recipients of the 
Democratic Party to the total number of unique political donation recipients of both parties. 
These four measures had similar mean and standard deviations and they exhibited high reliability 
(α = 0.98), and I averaged them to compute a composite index of CEO liberalism ranging from 0 
(highly conservative) to 1 (highly liberal).  
 
Figure 2.The Distribution of CEO Liberalism Scores 
The mean CEO liberalism score in the full sample was 0.363 with a standard deviation of 
0.316, showing that CEOs in the sample are more likely to be conservative-leaning (Figure 2) 
although their political orientations do vary. More precisely, about 31.34% of the CEOs were 
liberal-leaning (score above 0.5), 68.25% were conservative-leaning (score below 0.5), and 
0.41% were moderate (score equal to 0.5).  
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Among the notable strongly liberal CEOs in the sample were Ursula M. Burns of Xerox, 
John Warnock of Adobe, and James D. Sinegal of Costco, while among the notable strongly-
conservative CEOs were Rex W. Tillerson of Exxon Mobile, Daniel E. Evans of Bob Evans 
Farms, and James A. Skinner of McDonald's.  
I tracked the composition of the political ideologies of S&P1500 CEO over the years from 
1992 to 2014. As shown in Figure 3, while the proportion of liberal-oriented CEOs has been 
slowly growing in the years approaching 2014, conservative-leaning CEOs predominately filled 
the top leadership positions in S&P1500 firms.  
 
Figure 3. Trends in the Composition of the Political Ideology of S&P1500 CEOs from 1992 to 2014 
I also examined the ideological composition of S&P1500 CEOs who led firms in high-
tech and non-high-tech industries between 1992 and 2014. Innovation has a pivotal role in the 
success of firms in high-tech industries and it is interesting to examine the ideological 
composition of their CEOs and compare it to that of non-tech industries. Following prior 
research (Tang et al., 2015), I considered the following six three-digit SIC codes representing 
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high-tech industries: 283 (drugs), 357 (office, computing, and accounting machines), 366 
(communication equipment), 367 (electronic components and accessories), 481 (telephone 
communication services), and 737 (computer and data processing services). The results are 
shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Overall, while conservative CEOs dominated both groups of 
industries, interestingly, the proportion of liberals and moderate CEOs was higher in high-tech 
industries than in non-high-tech industries.  
  
Figure 4.The Composition of the Political Ideology of 
S&P1500 CEOs Active in High-Tech Industries.  
Figure 5.The Composition of the Political Ideology of 
S&P1500 CEOs Active in Non-High-Tech Industries.  
I examined the distribution of S&P1500 CEOs across different states. As shown in Figure 
6, in most states conservative CEOs dominated the leadership of S&P1500 firms over the years 
from 1992 to 2014, the exceptions being states such as Massachusetts, Hawaii, and New York. 
Interestingly, these states are among the most strongly liberal states according to Gallup’s most 
recent (Jones, 2019) and previous ratings (Jones, 2009) of the political bent of U.S. states. 
However, there is no evidence of prevalence of liberal CEOs in other strongly liberal states such 
as Connecticut, Delaware, California, and Illinois.  
 
 
 
39.38%
0.49%
60.12%
Liberal Moderate Conservative
30.12%
0.38%69.51%
Liberal Moderate Conservative
 
50 
 
 
Figure 6. The Composition of the Political Ideology of S&P1500 CEOs Across Different States. 
Control variables 
I controlled for several variables at the firm, the CEO and environmental levels, to rule out 
alternative explanations of the proposed relationships. At the firm level, I controlled for firm 
performance (measured by ROA) as performance is shown to influence innovation (Bowen, 
Rostami, & Steel, 2010), firm size (measured by the log of the number of employees) because 
firm size has been shown to influence innovation outcomes (Camisón-Zornoza, Lapiedra-
Alcamí, Segarra-Ciprés, & Boronat-Navarro, 2004), and R&D intensity (measured by the ratio of 
R&D investment to total assets) to account for the intensity of R&D efforts that impact 
innovation outcomes. Following prior studies, I assigned a zero to firms with missing R&D 
expenditure in each sample-year (Sunder et al., 2017; Tang et al., 2015).18  
Further, I controlled for Tobin’s Q (measured by market-to-book ratio) because firms with 
more growth opportunities focus more on innovation (Sheikh, 2012). I also controlled for 
                                                          
18 As I discussed in the robustness check, excluding firms with missing R&D did not change the results.  
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leverage (measured by debt-to-assets ratio) because financially distressed firms could reduce 
their investments in innovation and therefore have reduced innovation outcomes (Bhagat & 
Welch, 1995). I also controlled for institutional ownership (measured by the total shares owned 
by institutional owners) because institutional ownership has been shown to be associated with 
innovation (Aghion, Van Reenen, & Zingales, 2013). I also controlled for several CEO-level 
variables. CEOs are not unconstrained in exercising their personal preferences in business 
decisions and how much power they possess to influence firms’ outcomes varies. To account for 
CEO power and influence, I controlled for several sources of power widely used in previous 
studies (Finkelstein, 1992; Pollock, Fischer & Wade, 2002). I controlled for CEO tenure 
(measured as the number of years since the CEO was appointed to this position); CEO duality 
(coded 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the board and 0 if not) and CEO stock ownership 
(measured as the percentage of total shares owned by the CEO). I also included two controls to 
account for factors that might influence a CEO’s risk-taking. First, to capture the risk-taking 
effect of CEO incentives I included CEO Vega (measured as the change in the dollar value of a 
CEO's option holdings for a 1% change in stock-return volatility) (Coles et al., 2006; Core & 
Guay, 2002). Second, I controlled for CEO age to account for differences in CEOs’ motive 
towards taking risk that may arise because of the stage of their career (Matta & Beamish, 2008). 
Because including CEO age in the models increased variance inflation factors (VIF), I entered 
quantiles of CEO age in the hypotheses-testing models. When explaining hypotheses 6 and 7 
related to female inventors, I controlled for Female CEO (coded 1 if the CEO is female and 0 if 
not) and female representation in TMT (measured as the number of female executives divided by 
the total number of executives in TMT). Including these variables in the model rules out the 
possibility that the representation of female inventors is due to the natural tendency of female 
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executives (female CEO or female TMTs) to evaluate female inventors more favorably in their 
hiring decisions (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). I considered all executives reported in ExecuComp as 
members of a firm’s TMT (Dezsö, Ross, & Uribe, 2016; Dezsö & Ross, 2012). The average 
TMT size in my sample is 4.8 with a standard deviation of 1.34. This size is in accordance with 
prior research reporting TMT sizes of between three and seven executives (Carpenter & Sanders, 
2002). 
I also controlled for the effects of time and industry by including industry (two-digit SIC 
codes) and year dummies in the models.  
Estimation Method  
My data represented an unbalanced panel of 959 firms over 23 years (n=9776 firm-years) 
with majority of my dependent variables measured by count data. While models such as Poisson 
regression can be useful when the dependent variable is count data, Poisson models assume that 
the mean and variance of the distribution are equal. Since my data exhibited overdispersion 
(variances of the dependent variables are greater than their means), I did not use Poisson 
regression (Fleming, 2001). Instead, I used Random-effect Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression to test the models and I repeated my analyses with a Random-effect Negative 
Binomial model19. I did not use a fixed-effect model because the main independent variable in 
my models (i.e., CEO liberalism) is time-invariant. I used the xtreg command in Stata 16.0 with 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to test all the OLS regression models. Because 
the patent data is highly skewed, with numerous firms having zero patents in each year, 
following previous studies (Balsmeier et al., 2017; Custódio et al., 2019; Hirshleifer et al., 2012), 
                                                          
19 As shown in table A.2 in the appendix, although for a few lags and dependent variables the negative binomial 
regressions did not converge, generally I found consistent results between OLS and Negative Binomial models. 
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I added all patent-based dependent variables by one and log transformed them before entering 
them to the models. With this operationalization I kept the firm-years with zero patents.  
In general, there is a time lag from the start of an innovation project to when the 
corresponding patent is filed (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011). This time lag may vary by industry, 
with some industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals) taking a relatively long time while others (e.g. 
software development) may have quite short lags. This lag may also vary by the nature of 
particular innovation projects; exploratory innovations usually take longer time than exploitative 
ones (March, 1991). In fact, it is expected that CEO preferences and other explanatory variables 
need some time to become visible in the patent data (Balsmeier & Buchwald, 2015; Cummings 
& Knott, 2017). While there has been no research on this average time-lag (Galasso & Simcoe, 
2011), studies in the innovation literature have used different lags in testing regression models. 
In this study, I used one, two, and three-year lags in testing all the hypotheses (Balsmeier & 
Buchwald, 2014; Cho & Kim, 2017; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Islam & Zein, 2020). Using a 
lagged structure also resolve the simultaneity bias issues in my models. 
Results  
As several dependent and explanatory variables in this study are transformed, I first report 
the descriptive statistics of them before transformation. As shown in Table 2, the average number 
of patent applications by firms was 78.4 per year. Also, the average firm filed 2 breakthrough 
and 13.7 failure patents while the breakthrough range was from 0 to 115 and the failure range 
was from 0 to 2823. These patterns provide additional evidence that innovation is risky and that 
even those innovation projects that lead to granted patents may eventually fail to create value for 
the firm. On average, 3 patent applications were in new technological classes and 14.9 patents 
relied on knowledge new to the firm. Furthermore, an average firm had 1.3 patents funded by the 
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government during the sample period. The average firm in the sample had 20.6 (in thousands) 
employees and was led by a 56-year-old CEO.   
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Before Transformation 
Variables  Observations Mean St.Dev Min Max 
Number of patents  9,776 78.391 273.841 0 8731 
Breakthroughs 9,776 2.066 6.785 0 115 
Failures 9,776 13.725 66.418 0 2823 
New knowledge 9,776 14.977 40.921 0 583 
New technology 9,776 3.029 4.106 0 42 
Citations to science 9,776 455.532 2366.241 0 99148 
Government funded  9,776 1.305 9.299 0 368 
CEO age 9,374 56 7.4 29 96 
Firm size (employees in 1000) 9,688 20.61 44.81 0 745 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics (transformed and non-transformed) and Table 4 
shows correlations among all variables. The average CEO had been in the office for 8.1 years 
and owns 3.4% of the firm’s stock. As reported in Table 3, females on average accounted for a 
small number of inventors in the sample firms. Also, average CEO liberalism in the final sample 
was 0.348, reflecting a lean toward conservatism. As shown in Table 4, CEO liberalism has a 
positive correlation with breakthroughs, proxies representing the pursuit of basic research 
(government funded and citations to science), and measures of female inventors’ representation. 
However, CEO liberalism had negative correlations with the number of patents, failures, and the 
two measures of exploratory innovation (new knowledge and new technology). There is a 
positive correlation between R&D intensity and the number of patents, consistent with the fact 
that R&D provides input to the innovation process and patents are the outputs of this process 
(Artz, Norman, Hatfield, & Cardinal, 2010). The positive association between measures of 
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exploratory innovations and breakthroughs and failures also demonstrate that pursuing a strategy 
of exploration that involves more risky innovation projects increases the likelihood of developing 
both high-quality and low-quality innovations (Balsmeier et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2020). Overall, 
the correlations among independent and control variables are mostly low to moderate, mitigating 
the issue of multi-collinearity. I further checked for multi-collinearity in regression models by 
calculating VIFs for individual variables and full models. All VIFs were lower than 10 and 
revealed no serious multi-collinearity concerns (Kennedy, 2008).   
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of all Variables  
Variables*  Observations Mean St.Dev Min Max 
 Number of patents  9,776  2.477 1.894 0 9.075 
 Breakthroughs  9,776  .484 .861 0 4.754 
 Failures  9,776  1.039 1.407 0 7.946 
 New knowledge  9,776  1.507 1.427 0 6.365 
 New technology  9,776  .986 .881 0 3.761 
 Citations to science  9,776  2.614 2.653 0 11.504 
 Government funded  9,776  .207 .653 0 5.911 
 Female inventors in firm 8,025 .16 .137 0 1 
 Female inventors in teams 7,992 .138 .121 0 1 
 R&D intensity 9,740 .06 .121 0 8.497 
 Leverage 9,692 .173 .164 0 1.705 
 Firm size 9,687 1.807 1.656 -5.809 6.613 
 Firm performance (ROA in 1000) 9,754 .0003 0.018 -.0765 1.743 
 Tobin's Q 9,473 1.612 2.751 0 104.102 
 Institutional ownership (in billion) 9,776 14.655 45.779 0 590.341 
 CEO Vega (in 1000) 9,203 .183 .398 0 11.262 
 CEO age *  9,374 2.573 1.094 1 4 
 CEO duality 9,776 .653 .476 0 1 
 CEO tenure 9,732 8.14 7.924 0 61 
 CEO ownership 5,825 3.424 7.351 0 100 
 CEO liberalism 9,776 .348 .334 0 1 
All patent-based variables are added by one and log transformed.  
Quantiles of CEO age 
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Table 4. Correlations Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variables:  
  (1) Number of patents 1 
  (2) Breakthroughs 0.733* 1 
  (3) Failures 0.787* 0.613* 1 
  (4) New knowledge 0.905* 0.659* 0.696* 1 
  (5) New technology 0.810* 0.566* 0.522* 0.821* 1 
  (6) Citations to science 0.810* 0.675* 0.720* 0.670* 0.570* 1 
  (7) Government funded 0.480* 0.467* 0.499* 0.490* 0.396* 0.444* 1 
  (8) Female inventors in firm 0.155* 0.148* 0.276* 0.056* -0.042* 0.333* 0.057* 1 
  (9) Female inventors in teams 0.176* 0.167* 0.294* 0.065* -0.032* 0.364* 0.070* 0.934* 1 
Control variables:           
  (10) R&D intensity 0.027* 0.051* 0.008 0.012 -0.035* 0.140* -0.014 0.153* 0.152* 
  (11) Leverage -0.014 -0.056* 0.008 -0.033* -0.008 -0.046* 0.001 0.021 0.038* 
  (12) Firm size 0.531* 0.388* 0.492* 0.544* 0.465* 0.320* 0.354* 0.031* 0.042* 
  (13) Firm performance -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 0.009 0.018 
  (14) Tobin's Q 0.027* 0.076* -0.026* -0.001 0.005 0.113* -0.034* 0.069* 0.069* 
  (15) Institutional ownership 0.368* 0.392* 0.478* 0.320* 0.186* 0.377* 0.255* 0.172* 0.188* 
  (16) CEO Vega 0.277* 0.261* 0.344* 0.246* 0.167* 0.274* 0.216* 0.154* 0.164* 
  (17) CEO age 0.004 -0.037* 0.011 0.011 0.025* -0.038* 0.012 -0.040* -0.046* 
  (18) CEO duality 0.093* 0.066* 0.063* 0.108* 0.123* 0.051* 0.093* -0.021 -0.013 
  (19) CEO tenure -0.127* -0.083* -0.122* -0.116* -0.107* -0.098* -0.087* -0.02 -0.030* 
  (20) CEO ownership -0.073* -0.012 -0.145* -0.027* 0.003 -0.090* -0.054* -0.080* -0.088* 
Independent variable:           
  (21) CEO liberalism -0.049* 0.014 -0.008 -0.061* -0.075* 0.059* 0.033* 0.081* 0.091* 
* shows significance at the 0.05 level  
 
(Table 4 cont'd.) 
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Variables (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Control variables:            
  (10) R&D intensity 1 
  (11) Leverage -0.098* 1 
  (12) Firm size -0.303* 0.173* 1 
  (13) Firm performance -0.036* 0.074* -0.025* 1 
  (14) Tobin's Q 0.213* -0.109* -0.163* 0.007 1 
  (15) Institutional ownership -0.004 -0.024* 0.330* 0.002 0.037* 1 
  (16) CEO Vega -0.026* 0.008 0.323* -0 0.067* 0.374* 1 
  (17) CEO age -0.091* 0.091* 0.125* 0 -0.092* 0.016 0.02 1 
  (18) CEO duality -0.085* 0.065* 0.226* -0.01 -0.050* 0.009 0.070* 0.251* 1 
  (19) CEO tenure 0.035* -0.105* -0.153* -0.01 0.020* -0.036* 0.033* 0.340* 0.188* 1 
  (20) CEO ownership -0.013 -0.117* -0.063* -0.01 0.069* -0.037* 0.025 0.083* 0.102* 0.395* 1 
Independent variable:            
  (21) CEO liberalism 0.082* -0.035* -0.138* 0.014 0.038* 0.012 0.048* -0.074* -0.092* 0.074* 0.097* 1 
* shows significance at the 0.05 level 
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Table 5 through Table 17 report the results of testing the study’s hypotheses. Each table 
presents separate models (control and full models) for one, two and three-year lags.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that CEO liberalism is positively associated with the quantity of 
innovations developed by a firm, and Table 5 shows the results of testing this hypothesis. I 
entered control variables into models 1, 3, and 5 and tested the hypothesized relationship in 
models 2, 4, and 6. While all coefficients are in line with the hypothesis (β2=0.052, β4=0.060, 
β6=0.055) none are statistically significant (p2= 0.667, p4= 0.608, p6= 0.668). The results do not 
support Hypothesis 1, that CEO liberalism (conservatism) is positively (negatively) associated 
with the number of patent applications by a firm. Control variables show some interesting 
results. In line with prior research (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Tang et al., 2015), R&D intensity 
has a positive effect (and statistically significant for two and three-year lags) on the number of 
patents. I found that larger firms (measured with the log of the number of employees) and those 
with higher growth opportunities (measured by Tobins’Q) tend to file more patents. Confirming 
prior research (Aghion et al., 2013), firms with institutional owners file more patents. Among 
CEO-related controls, CEO age and CEO tenure have a negative effect on patenting activities of 
firms. These results correspond with previous research (Cho & Kim, 2017; Heyden, Reimer, & 
Van Doorn, 2017) showing that seasoned CEOs have lower incentive to pursue innovation 
because of the risk associated with it and the fact that they might not be able to personally benefit 
from the results of such projects that mostly pay off in the long term.  
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Table 5. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on the Number of Patents 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
R&D intensity 0.697 0.696 0.703+ 0.701+ 0.616* 0.617* 
 (0.439) (0.439) (0.394) (0.394) (0.289) (0.289) 
       
Leverage -0.042 -0.043 -0.195 -0.195 -0.269 -0.269 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) 
       
Firm size 0.471** 0.472** 0.449** 0.449** 0.414** 0.415** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
       
Firm performance (ROA) 0.017 0.016 0.312** 0.311** -0.280** -0.281** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.069) (0.069) (0.065) (0.065) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.015+ 0.015+ 0.015+ 0.015+ 0.019* 0.020* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
       
Institutional ownership 0.070** 0.070** 0.064** 0.065** 0.060** 0.060** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
       
CEO Vega 0.076 0.077 0.041 0.042 0.020 0.021 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
       
CEO age -0.015 -0.014 -0.023 -0.022 -0.047+ -0.046+ 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
       
CEO duality -0.061 -0.059 -0.076 -0.074 -0.089 -0.087 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.061) (0.060) (0.065) (0.064) 
       
CEO tenure -0.008* -0.008* -0.009* -0.009* -0.007 -0.008+ 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
CEO stockownership 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
CEO liberalism  0.052  0.060  0.055 
  (0.120)  (0.118)  (0.129) 
       
Constant 0.938 0.924 0.517 0.500 0.755 0.741 
 (1.214) (1.215) (1.218) (1.219) (1.218) (1.217) 
Observations 4736 4736 4262 4262 3797 3797 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.252 0.252 0.251 0.251 0.235 0.234 
Between R-squared 0.392 0.393 0.373 0.374 0.359 0.361 
Overall R-squared 0.395 0.396 0.379 0.380 0.367 0.368 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
(+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01)
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In Hypothesis 2, I suggested that CEO liberalism is positively associated with 
breakthrough innovations. The results of testing this hypothesis is reported in Table 6 and by 
models 2, 4, and 6. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, I found a positive and marginally significant 
relationship between CEO liberalism and breakthrough innovations with one-year lag (β2=0.104, 
p2= 0.051) and a positive and significant relationship with two-year lag (β4= 0.107, p4= 0.041). 
However, I found a positive and insignificant (β6= 0.084, p6= 0.111) relationship between these 
variables when considering a three-year lag. It seems that the effect of CEO liberalism phases out 
as the time lag increases. It may be that not only is the development of breakthrough innovations 
occasional, but also after introducing a breakthrough the innovative firm may tend to shift its 
focus to exploiting the new opportunities provided by it rather than the exploration that lead to 
the new breakthrough. These results provide evidence supporting Hypothesis 2, that a liberal 
CEO increases breakthrough innovation by around 11% (calculated as 1-e0.107).  
Hypothesis 3 examines the relationship between CEO liberalism and failure innovations. 
As shown by models 2, 4, and 6 in Table 7, the association is in the hypothesized direction but 
not statistically significant in any of the models (β2= 0.021, p2= 0.839; β4=0.072, p4= 0.460; 
β6=0.059, p6= 0.546) models, thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Interestingly, according to the 
results of Hypotheses 2 and 3, while CEO liberalism is associated with high-quality innovations, 
it has no influence on low-quality innovations. A more detailed discussion of these results will be 
provided in chapter 5.  
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Table 6. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on the Quality of Innovations-Breakthroughs 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
R&D intensity 0.343* 0.339* 0.261+ 0.257+ 0.306* 0.304* 
 
(0.153) (0.153) (0.155) (0.154) (0.155) (0.155) 
       
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 -0.022 -0.022 0.027 0.027 
 
(0.084) (0.085) (0.079) (0.079) (0.093) (0.094) 
       
Firm size 0.110** 0.111** 0.103** 0.104** 0.090** 0.091** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
       
Firm performance (ROA) -0.071+ -0.075+ -0.070* -0.075* -0.022 -0.027 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.008 0.008 0.011** 0.011** 0.015** 0.015** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Institutional ownership 0.036** 0.036** 0.033** 0.033** 0.027** 0.027** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
CEO Vega 0.039 0.040 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
       
CEO age -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.012 -0.010 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
       
CEO duality 0.012 0.016 0.021 0.025 0.016 0.020 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) 
       
CEO tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
CEO stockownership 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
CEO liberalism  0.104+  0.107*  0.084 
 
 (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053) 
       
Constant 0.171 0.143 -0.049 -0.079 0.046 0.025 
 (0.525) (0.523) (0.530) (0.529) (0.507) (0.506) 
Observations 4729 4729 4250 4250 3781 3781 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.076 0.077 0.067 0.068 0.052 0.052 
Between R-squared 0.281 0.284 0.262 0.266 0.235 0.240 
Overall R-squared 0.222 0.227 0.206 0.212 0.201 0.207 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
(+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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Table 7. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on the Quality of Innovations-Failures   
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
R&D intensity 0.649** 0.649** 0.642* 0.641* 0.466+ 0.468+ 
 
(0.234) (0.235) (0.250) (0.251) (0.251) (0.252) 
       
Leverage -0.124 -0.124 -0.212 -0.212 -0.230+ -0.230+ 
 
(0.129) (0.129) (0.138) (0.138) (0.129) (0.129) 
       
Firm size 0.317** 0.317** 0.340** 0.341** 0.337** 0.338** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) 
       
Firm performance 
(ROA) 
-0.060 -0.060 -0.157* -0.160* -0.212** -0.214** 
 
(0.083) (0.083) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.010 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
Institutional ownership 0.103** 0.103** 0.099** 0.099** 0.092** 0.092** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
       
CEO Vega 0.176* 0.176* 0.170* 0.171* 0.168+ 0.168+ 
 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.080) (0.080) (0.089) (0.089) 
       
CEO age -0.028 -0.027 -0.019 -0.017 -0.026 -0.024 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
       
CEO duality -0.051 -0.050 -0.087+ -0.084+ -0.066 -0.063 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) 
       
CEO tenure -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** -0.013** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
CEO stockownership 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
CEO liberalism  0.021  0.072  0.059 
 
 (0.102)  (0.098)  (0.097) 
       
Constant 0.508 0.502 0.207 0.187 0.109 0.094 
 (0.847) (0.848) (0.863) (0.863) (0.790) (0.790) 
Observations 4729 4729 4250 4250 3781 3781 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.405 0.405 0.392 0.392 0.368 0.368 
Between R-squared 0.585 0.586 0.577 0.579 0.547 0.549 
Overall R-squared 0.535 0.535 0.511 0.512 0.479 0.480 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
(+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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Hypothesis 4 predicts that CEO liberalism is positively associated with exploratory 
innovations, and the result of testing this hypothesis is reported in Table 8 and Table 9. As 
shown by Models 2, 4, and 6 test the effect of CEO liberalism on the first measure of exploratory 
innovation (the number of patents that built on new knowledge). As shown in Table 8, the 
association of CEO liberalism with new knowledge is positive and in accordance with the 
hypothesis in all three models (β2= 0.050, β4=0.083, β6=0.121), but this effect is not statistically 
significant (p2= 0.492, p4= 0.268, p6= 0.148).  
As reported in Table 9, I tested models 2, 4, and 6 with the second measure of exploratory 
innovation (the number of new technological domains a firm enters each year). Again, the effect 
of CEO liberalism on new technology is consistent with the hypothesized direction (β2= 0.092, 
β4=0.050, β6=0.059). This effect is significant in the model with a one-year lag (p2= 0.029) but 
not significant in the other two models (p4= 0.288, p6= 0.254), so I found support for Hypothesis 
3. Having a liberal CEO increases exploring new technological domains by about 10%.   
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Table 8. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on Exploratory Innovations-New Knowledge  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
R&D intensity 0.554* 0.552* 0.590* 0.587* 0.330 0.330 
 
(0.245) (0.245) (0.253) (0.253) (0.235) (0.235) 
       
Leverage -0.157 -0.157 -0.310* -0.310* -0.224+ -0.224+ 
 
(0.119) (0.119) (0.132) (0.132) (0.119) (0.120) 
       
Firm size 0.364** 0.365** 0.344** 0.345** 0.317** 0.319** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
       
Firm performance (ROA) 0.326** 0.324** -0.106 -0.109+ -0.101+ -0.106+ 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.066) (0.066) (0.057) (0.057) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.011** 0.012** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Institutional ownership 0.049** 0.049** 0.047** 0.047** 0.040** 0.040** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
       
CEO Vega 0.076 0.076 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.031 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.049) (0.050) 
       
CEO age -0.031+ -0.030 -0.037+ -0.035+ -0.041* -0.038+ 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
       
CEO duality 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.012 -0.025 -0.019 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.048) 
       
CEO tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
CEO stockownership 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
CEO liberalism  0.050  0.083  0.121 
 
 (0.072)  (0.075)  (0.084) 
       
Constant -0.149 -0.163 -0.309 -0.332 0.270 0.240 
 (0.473) (0.475) (0.487) (0.487) (0.377) (0.377) 
Observations 4729 4729 4250 4250 3781 3781 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.264 0.264 0.266 0.266 0.260 0.259 
Between R-squared 0.413 0.415 0.391 0.393 0.364 0.368 
Overall R-squared 0.420 0.421 0.404 0.406 0.389 0.393 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
(+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Table 9. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on Exploratory Innovations-New Technology 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
R&D intensity 0.368* 0.362* 0.395* 0.392* 0.131 0.130 
 
(0.183) (0.182) (0.178) (0.177) (0.148) (0.148) 
       
Leverage -0.163* -0.164* -0.157* -0.158* -0.133 -0.134 
 
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.090) (0.090) 
       
Firm size 0.187** 0.189** 0.169** 0.170** 0.154** 0.155** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
       
Firm performance (ROA) 0.292** 0.286** 0.328** 0.324** -0.011 -0.015 
 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.051) (0.051) (0.059) (0.059) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.016** 0.017** 0.010* 0.010* 0.014** 0.014** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Institutional ownership 0.011* 0.011+ 0.010* 0.010* 0.008+ 0.007+ 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
CEO Vega 0.041 0.042 0.021 0.021 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) 
       
CEO age 0.005 0.007 -0.018 -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
       
CEO duality -0.006 -0.002 0.012 0.014 -0.024 -0.021 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) 
       
CEO tenure -0.003+ -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
CEO stockownership 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO liberalism  0.092*  0.050  0.059 
 
 (0.042)  (0.047)  (0.052) 
       
Constant 0.076 0.050 0.177 0.162 0.043 0.029 
 (0.320) (0.321) (0.329) (0.331) (0.263) (0.262) 
Observations 4729 4729 4250 4250 3781 3781 
Year fixed effects YES YES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects YES YES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors YES YES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.243 0.244 0.249 0.249 0.250 0.250 
Between R-squared 0.269 0.271 0.225 0.226 0.233 0.235 
Overall R-squared 0.295 0.295 0.284 0.284 0.293 0.294 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
(+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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Hypothesis 5 examines the association of CEO liberalism with firms’ engagement with 
basic research in their innovation efforts. The results of testing this hypothesis are shown in 
Table 10 and Table 11.  Models 2, 4, and 6 in Table 10 show the results of testing the 
relationship between CEO liberalism and citations to science. While the coefficients for all 
models are in the predicted direction, none of them are statistically significant (β2= 0.161, p2= 
0.456; β4=0.069, p4= 0.732; β6=0.059, p6=0.765).  
Models 2, 4, and 6 in Table 11 report the results of testing the association between CEO 
liberalism and innovations funded by the government. As shown in the table, there is a 
marginally-significant relationship between these variables when considering a two-year lag 
(β4=0.051, p4=0.069) but this relationship is not significant for one-year (β2=.041, p2=0.267) or 
three-year lags (β6=.028, p6=0.231) although these effects are in the hypothesized direction, so 
Hypothesis 5 is marginally supported, i.e., having a liberal CEO increases the development of 
government funded innovations by about 5.23%. Examination of control variables shown in 
Table 10 and Table 11 also reveals interesting patterns. Firm size has a positive and statistically 
significant association with both measures. The coefficient of firm size is higher for citations to 
science than developing innovations funded by the government. These results provide evidence 
that larger firms usually have more resources to commit to basic research projects that take a 
long time to develop and pay off. Furthermore, such firms are more likely to have a more diverse 
range of products and processes that make them confident that they will be able to benefit from 
the results of basic research in some of their business areas (Rosenberg, 1990). Institutional 
ownership is found to be positively related to engagement in basic research. The negative and 
statistically-significant relationship between ROA and government-funded innovations shown in 
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Table 11 provides evidence that underperforming firms may tend to find external sources to fund 
their innovation endeavors.  
Table 10. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on Engagement in Basic Research-Citations to Science 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
R&D intensity 1.059 1.061 1.472+ 1.475+ 1.259* 1.268* 
 
(0.812) (0.812) (0.799) (0.799) (0.640) (0.640) 
 
      
Leverage -0.020 -0.022 -0.172 -0.172 -0.267 -0.268 
 
(0.226) (0.227) (0.252) (0.252) (0.245) (0.245) 
 
      
Firm size 0.421** 0.423** 0.396** 0.397** 0.365** 0.367** 
 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) 
 
      
Firm performance (ROA) 2.296** 2.292** 1.710** 1.708** -0.390* -0.393* 
 
(0.168) (0.168) (0.093) (0.093) (0.162) (0.162) 
 
      
Tobin's Q 0.036** 0.037** 0.044** 0.045** 0.041* 0.042* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) 
 
      
Institutional ownership 0.100** 0.100** 0.092** 0.092** 0.089** 0.090** 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
      
CEO Vega 0.032 0.034 -0.009 -0.009 -0.032 -0.031 
 
(0.114) (0.115) (0.094) (0.095) (0.086) (0.086) 
 
      
CEO age 0.004 0.008 -0.034 -0.032 -0.043 -0.042 
 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
 
      
CEO duality -0.060 -0.054 -0.050 -0.047 -0.047 -0.044 
 
(0.083) (0.083) (0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.084) 
 
      
CEO tenure -0.013+ -0.013* -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
      
CEO stockownership 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
      
CEO liberalism  0.161  0.069  0.059 
 
 (0.216)  (0.201)  (0.198) 
 
      
Constant 2.776 2.732 1.993 1.974 1.288 1.273 
 (1.996) (1.998) (1.998) (1.999) (2.091) (2.089) 
Observations 4729 4729 4250 4250 3781 3781 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.105 0.104 0.095 0.095 0.082 0.081 
Between R-squared 0.356 0.360 0.350 0.352 0.338 0.341 
Overall R-squared 0.325 0.328 0.321 0.323 0.304 0.306 
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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Table 11. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on Engagement in Basic Research-Government Funded Innovations     
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
R&D intensity 0.014 0.014 -0.104 -0.105 -0.048 -0.048 
 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057) 
 
      
Leverage 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.011 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) 
 
      
Firm size 0.053** 0.054** 0.044* 0.045* 0.037* 0.037* 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
      
Firm performance (ROA) -0.053+ -0.054+ -0.063** -0.064** -0.071** -0.072** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
      
Tobin's Q 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
      
Institutional ownership 0.026* 0.026* 0.028* 0.028* 0.024 0.024 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
      
CEO Vega 0.078** 0.078** 0.060* 0.061* 0.074+ 0.074+ 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042) (0.042) 
 
      
CEO age 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
      
CEO duality -0.011 -0.009 0.010 0.012 -0.005 -0.004 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
      
CEO tenure -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
      
CEO stockownership 0.002 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
      
CEO liberalism  0.041  0.051+  0.028 
 
 (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.023) 
 
      
Constant -0.146+ -0.157+ -0.068 -0.082 -0.110 -0.117 
 (0.078) (0.081) (0.112) (0.113) (0.123) (0.124) 
Observations 4729 4729 4250 4250 3781 3781 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.078 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.070 0.069 
Between R-squared 0.264 0.269 0.253 0.258 0.238 0.242 
Overall R-squared 0.194 0.198 0.175 0.181 0.148 0.151 
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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Hypothesis 6 predicts a positive relationship between CEO liberalism and representation 
of female inventors in firms. The results of testing this hypothesis is reported in Table 12 and in 
models 2, 4, and 6. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficients of female inventors in firm 
are positive in all models (β2=0.016, p2= 0.114; β4=0.014, p4= 0.184) and is statistically 
significant in the model for a three-year lag (β6=0.027, p6=0.016), so Hypothesis 6 is supported. 
These results show that more time is needed for CEO liberalism to influence the presence of 
females in firms, possibly because the institutionalization of CEO values in human resource 
policies and practices to influence selection and hiring decisions takes some time. Presence of a 
liberal CEO increases the ratio of female inventors by 2.7%.  
Hypothesis 7 suggests that CEO liberalism positively impacts the representation of female 
inventors in innovation teams. As shown in Table 13, consistent with this hypothesis, the 
coefficients for all models are positive (β2=0.018, β4=0.016, β6=0.026). This relationship is 
statistically significant for models with one (p2= 0.036) and three-year lags (p6= 0.008) and is 
marginally significant for the model with two-year lag (p4= 0.075). Thus, Hypothesis 7 is 
supported. The existence of a liberal CEO increases the ratio of female inventors in innovation 
firms by about 1.6% to 2.6%.  
These results indicate that it takes longer for CEO liberalism to influence the 
representation of females in a firm than in innovation teams, possibly because of the longer time 
needed to recruit and hire employees. However, the influence of CEO liberalism in reducing 
inequality in provision of opportunity for female employees tend to be more immediate.  
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Table 12. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on the Representation of Female Inventors in Firm 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
R&D intensity 0.125** 0.124** 0.162** 0.161** 0.089 0.087 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.060) (0.060) (0.082) (0.081) 
       
Leverage 0.009 0.009 -0.004 -0.004 0.011 0.011 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
       
Firm size 0.009* 0.009* 0.010** 0.010** 0.004 0.005+ 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Firm performance (ROA) 0.278** 0.277** 0.459** 0.456** -5.550* -5.574* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (2.500) (2.509) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Institutional ownership 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
   
    
CEO Vega 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
CEO age -0.006+ -0.006+ -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
CEO duality -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
CEO tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.001+ -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
CEO ownership 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Female CEO 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.017 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) 
       
Female on TMT 0.043 0.043 -0.017 -0.017 -0.045 -0.045 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
       
CEO liberalism  0.016  0.014  0.027* 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
       
Constant 0.144** 0.141** -0.004 -0.006 0.081** 0.073** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.056) (0.055) (0.019) (0.020) 
Observations 3691 3691 3273 3273 2861 2861 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.065 0.066 0.059 0.061 
Between R-squared 0.324 0.326 0.329 0.330 0.267 0.270 
Overall R-squared 0.224 0.225 0.209 0.210 0.201 0.202 
Standard errors in parentheses.  (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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Table 13. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on the Representation of Female Inventors in Innovation Teams 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
R&D intensity 0.106* 0.105* 0.098* 0.097* -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.049) 
       
Leverage 0.032 0.032+ 0.015 0.016 0.021 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
       
Firm size 0.008* 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.006* 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Firm performance (ROA) 0.272** 0.270** 0.460** 0.457** -5.052* -5.100* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (2.081) (2.018) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.001 0.001 0.001+ 0.001+ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Institutional ownership 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
CEO Vega 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
CEO age -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
CEO duality 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
CEO tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
CEO ownership 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Female CEO 0.017 0.015 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.016 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) 
       
Female on TMT 0.025 0.025 -0.006 -0.007 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
       
CEO liberalism  0.018*  0.016+  0.026** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
       
Constant 0.030 0.025 -0.048* -0.052* -0.000 -0.008 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Observations 3764 3764 3367 3367 2953 2953 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.064 0.064 0.069 0.070 0.064 0.066 
Between R-squared 0.329 0.333 0.347 0.348 0.288 0.290 
Overall R-squared 0.239 0.241 0.231 0.232 0.219 0.222 
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010) 
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Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
To further establish the robustness of the empirical results, I conducted several robustness 
checks. First, to ensure that the obtained results are not driven by including firms with missing 
R&D expenditures, I excluded firms with no R&D expenditures reported in the Compustat 
database and retested the hypotheses. As reported in Table 14, that replicates Table 5 through 
Table 13, the overall results remained the same. I found support for Hypotheses 2, 6, and 7, 
marginal support for Hypothesis 4 and 5, and no support for Hypotheses 1 and 3.  
Second, I conducted some robustness analyses for testing the relationships between CEO 
liberalism and some of the dependent variables including breakthroughs and failures and 
measures of gender diversity of inventors. I also examined the effect of CEO liberalism on R&D 
intensity.  
 In the following I will provide the rationale and results of these analyses.  
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Table 14. Robustness Checks: Excluding Firms with Missing R&D Expenditures 
 Number of patents Breakthroughs 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
      
R&D intensity 0.632 0.631+ 0.631* 0.303* 0.216 0.260 
 (0.400) (0.365) (0.308) (0.152) (0.156) (0.158) 
 
      
Leverage -0.005 -0.177 -0.243 0.007 -0.017 0.028 
 (0.166) (0.185) (0.184) (0.095) (0.088) (0.104) 
 
      
Firm size 0.498** 0.471** 0.438** 0.121** 0.114** 0.097** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
 
      
Firm performance (ROA) -19.805* -17.362* 4.667 -4.886 -4.349 -1.163 
 (8.287) (7.371) (15.112) (3.158) (3.931) (4.030) 
 
      
Tobin's Q 0.014 0.014+ 0.019* 0.008 0.011** 0.015** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
      
Institutional ownership 0.066** 0.061** 0.058** 0.035** 0.031** 0.025** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
 
      
CEO Vega 0.079 0.050 0.023 0.041 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.073) (0.084) (0.093) (0.060) (0.050) (0.055) 
 
      
CEO age -0.014 -0.025 -0.058* 0.005 0.008 -0.008 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
 
      
CEO duality -0.041 -0.073 -0.083 0.016 0.028 0.021 
 (0.054) (0.060) (0.067) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) 
 
      
CEO tenure -0.010* -0.011* -0.009+ -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
      
CEO ownership 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
CEO liberalism 0.025 0.022 0.043 0.116* 0.122* 0.096+ 
 (0.121) (0.116) (0.129) (0.053) (0.050) (0.053) 
 
      
Constant 2.163* 1.647 1.649 0.483 0.285 0.353 
 (0.877) (1.104) (1.320) (0.582) (0.583) (0.594) 
Observations 4333 3887 3450 4325 3872 3432 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.262 0.260 0.243 0.078 0.069 0.052 
Between R-squared 0.390 0.383 0.361 0.286 0.279 0.242 
Overall R-squared 0.398 0.382 0.363 0.229 0.214 0.204 
Models with only control variables are not reported in this table.   
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
 
(Table 14 cont'd.)
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 Failures  New knowledge  New technology  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
R&D intensity 0.669** 0.667** 0.495+ 0.504* 0.539* 0.298 0.335+ 0.321* 0.122 
 (0.226) (0.245) (0.258) (0.232) (0.233) (0.237) (0.176) (0.162) (0.165) 
          
Leverage -0.100 -0.238 -0.277* -0.154 -0.331* -0.243+ -0.198* -0.190* -0.158+ 
 (0.141) (0.151) (0.140) (0.133) (0.144) (0.128) (0.085) (0.081) (0.094) 
          
Firm size 0.361** 0.383** 0.377** 0.391** 0.371** 0.348** 0.200** 0.179** 0.162** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
          
Firm performance (ROA) -14.277* -15.398* -10.850 -10.481 -15.347* -7.441 -9.197* -10.587** 3.897 
 (6.395) (6.540) (10.935) (8.363) (6.886) (9.254) (4.473) (3.761) (9.013) 
          
Tobin's Q 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.011** 0.015** 0.009+ 0.014** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
          
Institutional ownership 0.099** 0.093** 0.084** 0.046** 0.042** 0.037** 0.009 0.008 0.007 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
          
CEO Vega 0.159+ 0.207+ 0.255** 0.081 0.069 0.040 0.043 0.022 -0.031 
 (0.082) (0.106) (0.095) (0.057) (0.066) (0.070) (0.051) (0.053) (0.048) 
          
CEO age -0.027 -0.017 -0.030 -0.026 -0.032 -0.041+ 0.006 -0.019 -0.015 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
          
CEO duality -0.063 -0.097+ -0.071 0.010 0.000 -0.021 0.003 0.014 -0.020 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.055) (0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) 
          
CEO tenure -0.011** -0.012** -0.012** -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.004+ -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
          
CEO ownership 0.007 0.008* 0.008* 0.003 0.005 0.005 -0.000 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
          
CEO liberalism -0.017 0.037 0.035 0.065 0.096 0.137 0.086+ 0.049 0.061 
 (0.101) (0.095) (0.095) (0.074) (0.076) (0.087) (0.044) (0.048) (0.055) 
          
Constant 1.430** 1.058 0.908 0.321 0.136 0.653* 0.338 0.553** 0.230 
 (0.427) (0.652) (0.623) (0.325) (0.391) (0.294) (0.285) (0.214) (0.280) 
Observations 4325 3872 3432 4325 3872 3432 4325 3872 3432 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.413 0.399 0.376 0.276 0.280 0.271 0.253 0.257 0.253 
Between R-squared 0.598 0.599 0.563 0.417 0.403 0.380 0.268 0.235 0.242 
Overall R-squared 0.552 0.530 0.496 0.433 0.421 0.406 0.300 0.289 0.296 
Models with only control variables are not reported in this table.   
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
(Table 14 cont'd.) 
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 Citations to science  Government funded  
Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
 
      
R&D intensity 0.945 1.390+ 1.308* 0.004 -0.122 -0.065 
 (0.747) (0.781) (0.634) (0.066) (0.083) (0.070) 
 
      
Leverage 0.063 -0.077 -0.214 0.002 0.008 -0.003 
 (0.251) (0.276) (0.270) (0.040) (0.039) (0.033) 
 
      
Firm size 0.458** 0.423** 0.389** 0.063** 0.053** 0.043* 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
      
Firm performance (ROA) -29.031** -13.053 30.304 -5.335* -5.580* -5.365+ 
 (7.284) (10.438) (33.938) (2.568) (2.755) (2.749) 
 
      
Tobin's Q 0.039** 0.045** 0.042* 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
      
Institutional ownership 0.096** 0.088** 0.088** 0.025* 0.026* 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
 
      
CEO Vega 0.032 0.013 -0.027 0.086** 0.091** 0.121** 
 (0.120) (0.129) (0.123) (0.029) (0.026) (0.044) 
 
      
CEO age 0.006 -0.036 -0.051 0.011 0.002 0.005 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
 
      
CEO duality -0.060 -0.037 -0.066 -0.021 0.006 -0.008 
 (0.087) (0.090) (0.087) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) 
 
      
CEO tenure -0.012 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
CEO ownership 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002+ 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
CEO liberalism 0.184 0.101 0.075 0.023 0.051+ 0.034 
 (0.230) (0.212) (0.209) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) 
 
      
Constant 4.630** 3.859* 2.538 -0.083 -0.008 -0.067 
 (1.562) (1.688) (2.475) (0.064) (0.097) (0.124) 
Observations 4325 3872 3432 4325 3872 3432 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.101 0.092 0.086 0.083 0.082 0.077 
Between R-squared 0.363 0.359 0.339 0.276 0.271 0.256 
Overall R-squared 0.331 0.326 0.303 0.206 0.192 0.166 
Models with only control variables are not reported in this table.   
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01)  
(Table 14 cont'd.) 
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Variables 
Female inventors in firm Female inventors in teams 
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
R&D intensity 0.132** 0.153** 0.079 0.122** 0.091* -0.023 
 (0.043) (0.057) (0.083) (0.043) (0.042) (0.049) 
       
Leverage -0.003 -0.005 0.010 0.025 0.021 0.028+ 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) 
       
Firm size 0.012** 0.010** 0.004 0.011** 0.010** 0.005+ 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Firm performance 
(ROA) 
-0.818 0.061 -6.067* 0.899 1.419+ -5.416** 
 (2.613) (2.026) (2.506) (1.293) (0.837) (1.882) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001+ 0.001 0.001+ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Institutional 
ownership 
0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
CEO Vega 0.003 0.010* 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
       
CEO age -0.007* -0.003 -0.004 -0.005+ -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
CEO duality 0.001 0.002 0.013+ 0.006 0.002 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
CEO tenure 0.000 -0.001+ -0.000 0.000 -0.001+ -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
CEO ownership 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.002+ 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Female CEO 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.018 0.021 0.014 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) 
       
Female on TMT 0.041 -0.008 -0.040 0.020 -0.003 -0.017 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
       
CEO liberalism 0.015 0.016 0.029** 0.017* 0.017+ 0.027** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
       
Constant 0.141** 0.002 0.077** 0.025 -0.046* -0.005 
 (0.029) (0.053) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.023) 
Observations 3469 3069 2676 3541 3161 2766 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard 
errors 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.068 0.061 0.056 0.065 0.066 0.064 
Between R-squared 0.306 0.309 0.272 0.308 0.290 0.267 
Overall R-squared 0.219 0.204 0.204 0.234 0.221 0.219 
Models with only control variables are not reported in this table.   
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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Alternative measures of breakthrough and failure innovations 
As previously mentioned, I measured breakthroughs and failures using forward citations 
up to 2019 received by patents after their application date. Because citations are accrued over 
time, patents filed earlier have a higher chance of obtaining forward citations and patents filed 
near the ending year of the sample have less time/chance to obtain forward citations. As a result, 
forward citations suffer from a time-truncation bias. To rule out the possibility that the results 
reported in Table 6 and Table 7 are influenced by this truncation problem, I tried alternative 
operationalizations of breakthroughs and failures. In these alternative measures I considered a 
five-year window from the date a patent is filed and counted the number of forward citations at 
the end of the fifth year (Lahriri, 2010). I tested Hypotheses 2 and 3 with these measures and the 
results are reported in Table 15. 
Models 2, 4, and 6 tested the effect of CEO liberalism on breakthrough innovations with 
the new operationalization. As shown in the table, the relationships are positive and significant 
for both a two-year lag (β4= 0.111, p4=0.048) and a three-year lag (β6= 0.111, p6= 0.041). I also 
found a marginally significant effect for one-year lag (β2= 0.093, p2= 0.076). These results show 
that a liberal CEO increases breakthrough innovation from about 9.75% to 11.74%.  
The results of models 8, 10, and 12 show that the association between CEO liberalism and 
failures are in the hypothesized direction but not significant (β8=0.018, p8=0.870; β10=0.028, p10= 
0.802; β12=0.023, p12=0.846).  
These results provide further support for the results reported in Table 6 and Table 7. CEO 
liberalism is positively and significantly related to breakthrough innovations and has a positive 
but not statistically significant association with failures.  
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Table 15. Robustness Checks: Testing for Alternative Measures of Breakthroughs (Models 1 To 6) and Failures (Models 7 To 12) 
 Breakthroughs  Failures  
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
             
R&D intensity 0.247* 0.242* 0.297+ 0.293+ 0.283+ 0.282+ 0.628 0.628 0.740* 0.739+ 0.613* 0.614* 
 (0.116) (0.115) (1.92) (1.91) (1.85) (1.84) (0.398) (0.398) (1.96) (1.96) (2.40) (2.40) 
             
Leverage -0.056 -0.057 -0.091 -0.091 -0.066 -0.066 -0.023 -0.023 -0.164 -0.164 -0.231 -0.231 
 (0.067) (0.067) (1.26) (1.27) (0.79) (0.79) (0.138) (0.138) (1.07) (1.07) (1.56) (1.55) 
             
Firm size 0.120** 0.121** 0.108** 0.109** 0.097** 0.099** 0.428** 0.429** 0.413** 0.413** 0.386** 0.387** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (6.16) (6.25) (5.08) (5.18) (0.033) (0.033) (12.00) (11.94) (11.14) (11.08) 
             
Firm performance  -0.027 -0.031 -0.047 -0.053+ 0.014 0.008 -0.187 -0.187 -0.167** -0.167** -0.175** -0.175** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.119) (0.119) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) 
             
Tobin's Q 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.012* 0.012* 0.013+ 0.013+ 0.014* 0.014* 0.018* 0.018* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.83) (0.89) (2.17) (2.23) (0.007) (0.007) (2.35) (2.35) (2.29) (2.29) 
             
Institutional ownership 0.037** 0.037** 0.032** 0.032** 0.025** 0.025** 0.063** 0.063** 0.058** 0.058** 0.056** 0.056** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
             
CEO Vega -0.001 -0.001 -0.042 -0.042 -0.049 -0.048 0.051 0.051 0.015 0.015 -0.039 -0.039 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.063) (0.063) 
             
CEO age -0.011 -0.009 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.011 -0.011 -0.021 -0.020 -0.047* -0.047* 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.14) (0.09) (0.48) (0.27) (0.022) (0.022) (0.93) (0.88) (2.02) (1.97) 
             
CEO duality 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.022 -0.004 0.001 -0.042 -0.041 -0.083 -0.082 -0.061 -0.059 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.63) (0.80) (0.13) (0.03) (0.050) (0.050) (1.52) (1.51) (1.00) (0.99) 
             
CEO tenure -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.007* -0.007* -0.008* -0.008* -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.15) (0.01) (0.70) (0.58) (0.003) (0.003) (2.22) (2.23) (1.47) (1.48) 
             
CEO ownership 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.20) (0.20) (0.49) (0.51) (0.007) (0.007) (0.79) (0.80) (0.29) (0.29) 
             
CEO liberalism  0.093+  0.111*  0.111*  0.018  0.028  0.023 
  (0.053)  (1.98)  (2.04)  (0.108)  (0.25)  (0.19) 
             
Constant 0.294 0.269 -0.031 -0.062 0.125 0.098 0.896 0.892 0.624 0.617 0.688 0.682 
 (0.515) (0.515) (0.06) (0.12) (0.24) (0.19) (1.041) (1.041) (0.58) (0.58) (0.64) (0.64) 
Observations 4729 4729 4250 4250 3781 3781 4729 4729 4250 4250 3781 3781 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.076 0.077 0.067 0.068 0.049 0.049 0.245 0.244 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262 
Between R-squared 0.297 0.301 0.261 0.266 0.234 0.243 0.391 0.392 0.373 0.374 0.360 0.361 
Overall R-squared 0.234 0.240 0.212 0.219 0.200 0.210 0.403 0.403 0.390 0.390 0.378 0.379 
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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Alternative explanations for the gender diversity of inventors 
As discussed above, CEO liberalism has a positive relationship with measures of gender 
diversity of inventors (representation of female inventors in firms and innovation teams). To 
further test the robustness of these results, I tested the models by including state fixed effects. 
This control rules out the possibility that the observed effect of CEO liberalism on inventors’ 
gender diversity is the result of the omitted variable of location. For example, it is likely that 
both CEO liberalism and the presence of female inventors are affected by the liberal ideology of 
the state where a firm is located. Also, location is likely to explain representation of female 
scientists because some locations may be more attractive for innovation activities of these 
scientists (Delgado, Mariani, & Murray, 2019). The result of including the state fixed effect is 
reported in Table 16. As shown in models 1 through 6, after addition of this control the effect of 
CEO liberalism on all measures of gender diversity of inventors is still marginally significant in 
models with a three-year lag (β3=0.023, p3=0.060; β6=0.018, p6=0.075). These results provide 
further support for hypotheses 6 and 7, i.e., that CEO liberalism is positively associated with 
representation of female inventors in firms and innovation teams.  
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Table 16. Robustness Checks: Controlling for State to Predict the Effect of CEO Liberalism on Inventors’ Gender 
Diversity 
Variables 
Female inventors in firm Female inventors in teams 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Model 6 
 
       
R&D intensity 0.089* 0.114+ 0.047 0.072+ 0.053 -0.057 
 (0.039) (0.059) (0.085) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) 
       
Leverage 0.009 -0.000 0.019 0.032+ 0.018 0.026+ 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) 
       
Firm size 0.013** 0.014** 0.008** 0.012** 0.013** 0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Firm performance 0.270** 0.484** -6.420* 0.258** 0.487** -5.402** 
 (0.046) (0.030) (2.814) (0.047) (0.026) (1.695) 
       
Tobin's Q 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001+ 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Institutional ownership 0.001 0.001* 0.002** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
CEO Vega 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
CEO age -0.005 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
CEO duality -0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
       
CEO tenure 0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001+ 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
CEO ownership 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
CEO gender 0.003 -0.000 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.011 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) 
       
Female on TMT 0.043 -0.019 -0.052+ 0.024 -0.011 -0.027 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
       
CEO liberalism 0.009 0.009 0.023+ 0.011 0.008 0.018+ 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
       
Observations 3686 3269 2858 3759 3363 2950 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.071 0.068 0.063 0.065 0.072 0.069 
Between R-squared 0.374 0.379 0.343 0.376 0.407 0.355 
Overall R-squared 0.250 0.237 0.219 0.265 0.266 0.256 
Models with only control variables are not shown in this table.   
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
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The effect of CEO liberalism on firms’ investment in innovation  
One important factor that influences the innovation activities of firms is the amount of 
investment they make in R&D. In fact, R&D investment provides the input required by the 
innovation process and influences outputs such as the number of patents and/or new products 
developed (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). The results from testing 
Hypothesis 1 did not provide evidence of a significant relationship between CEO liberalism and 
the number of patents developed by a firm, so these results show that the political ideology of 
CEOs does not tend to influence the outputs of innovation in firms. As additional analysis and to 
further deepen our understanding about the effect of CEO political ideology on innovation, I also 
tested the effect of CEO liberalism on R&D. I expected that liberal CEOs when compared to 
their conservative counterparts assign more priority to R&D and make greater investments in it, 
because their higher propensity to taking risks and exploring new knowledge domains make 
liberal CEOs more likely to shift scarce time and money to projects that not only deplete current 
earnings and pay off in the long-term, but also are associated with high risk of failure. Therefore, 
my hypothesis is that CEO liberalism is positively associated with R&D.  
Following prior research (Hirshleifer et al., 2012), I operationalized R&D by R&D 
intensity, measured by dividing R&D expenditures by total assets. This measure also shows the 
relative importance that firms ascribe to R&D. Table 17 reports the results of testing this 
hypothesis. I tested this effect on the full sample20 in model 2 and on the sample of firms without 
missing R&D expenditures on Compustat in model 4. I tested the effect of CEO liberalism on 
R&D by considering only a one-year lag because, in contrast to the effects of patents, the effect 
of CEO preferences on the amount of money to invest in R&D is more immediate (Galasso & 
                                                          
20 When considering R&D intensity as the dependent variable, I relaxed the restriction that to be included in the 
sample S&P1500 firms should match patent data.  
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Simcoe, 2011). As shown in the table, although the coefficients in models are positive and in the 
hypothesized direction, they are not statistically significant (β1=0.006, p1= 0.165; β4=0.004, 
p4=0.510), so the results do not conform to the hypothesis that liberal CEOs intensify R&D 
efforts in their firms. The results shown in Table 17 show that institutional ownership has a 
positive and significant effect on R&D intensity and smaller firms make more investments in 
R&D. Among CEO-level controls, CEO stock ownership negatively affects R&D. This effect is 
consistent with prior research showing that owning more shares decreases CEOs’ risk-taking 
propensity (Sanders, 2001). 
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Table 17. The Effect of CEO Liberalism on R&D Intensity  
 Including firms with missing R&D Excluding firms with missing R&D 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Leverage -0.001 -0.001 0.011 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) 
     
Firm size -0.014** -0.014** -0.019** -0.019** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
     
Firm performance (ROA) -0.090+ -0.091* -9.028** -9.012** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (1.977) (1.981) 
     
Tobin's Q 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Institutional ownership 0.001** 0.001** 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
CEO Vega 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
CEO age -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
CEO duality -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
     
CEO tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
CEO stockownership -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
CEO liberalism  0.006  0.004 
  (0.004)  (0.007) 
     
Constant 0.078** 0.076** 0.106** 0.105** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) 
Observations 9516 9516 6198 6198 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Between R-squared 0.280 0.281 0.335 0.336 
Overall R-squared 0.142 0.143 0.165 0.165 
Standard errors in parentheses. (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01)
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION  
My primary goal in this dissertation was to examine the role of CEOs’ liberal or 
conservative orientation in shaping firms’ innovation. I grounded my arguments on the tenets of 
upper-echelon theory related to the role of executives’ orientations in shaping their decisions 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and the body of research in political psychology that provides ample 
evidence regarding the different values and psychological needs of liberals and conservatives 
(Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017). Using a sample of S&P1500 CEOs from 1992 to 2014, I 
found that firms’ innovation outcomes and strategies are in part a reflection of their CEOs’ 
political ideologies. My results specifically show that CEO liberalism increases breakthrough 
innovations and is associated with exploration in new technology domains as well as pursuit of 
basic research. I also found that CEO liberalism shapes inventor-staffing strategy by decreasing 
the gap with respect to the presence of female inventors in the firm and in innovation teams. 
Contrary to my predictions, I did not find evidence that CEO liberalism increases the amount of 
R&D investment nor the number of innovations developed by firms, and the results also do not 
support the existence of an association between CEO liberalism and the number of failure 
innovations.  
Theoretical Implications and Future Research  
My study makes important contributions to several areas of research and suggests 
opportunities for future research: 
CEO political ideology literature 
My study extends the growing line of research on the consequences of CEOs’ ideological 
beliefs by demonstrating that such beliefs can shape firms’ innovation. The most notable finding 
of this dissertation is that CEO political ideology is not much consequential for how much 
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(quantity) firms innovate but is influential on how (strategy) they innovate. The finding that CEO 
political ideology neither influences the amount of R&D investments nor the number of 
innovations is interesting, considering the substantial body of research that shows liberals and 
conservatives have different attitudes toward uncertainty and new experiences (Carney et al., 
2008; Jost et al., 2003). These attributes have been shown in several previous studies to have a 
substantial influence on the degree to which a CEO prioritizes innovation (Lee et al., 2020; 
Sunder et al., 2017). This result suggests that although the viewpoints of liberals and 
conservatives may diverge over a wide range of societal and organizational domains, CEOs with 
different ideological orientations tend to come to agreement about the importance of innovation 
as a key driver of competitive advantage and long-term success (Schumpeter, 1942). The finding 
that CEO ideology does not impact R&D investment is inconsistent with prior research (Hutton 
et al., 2014) that showed a negative (positive) association between CEO conservatism 
(liberalism) and R&D. I speculate that this inconsistency may result partly from the fact that 
Hutton and colleagues used a different operationalization of CEO conservativism. To measure 
political ideology, they examined political donations in each cycle and coded CEO conservatism 
as 1 if all donations he/she made were directed to Republicans and zero otherwise, then 
calculated their conservatism index by taking the average of this variable across all years in 
which the CEO made donations. In contrast, my CEO liberalism index (Chin et al., 2013; 
Briscoe et al., 2014) considers donations to both parties and takes into account behavioral 
commitment (number of donations), financial commitment (amount of donations), persistence of 
commitment (number of years) and scope of commitment (count of distinct recipients). The 
correlation between the index of CEO liberalism in my study and their measure of CEO 
conservativism is -0.46. Another reason for this inconsistency could be the fact that Hutton et al. 
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(2014) considered a limited number of controls, mostly at the firm level21 while my hypothesis 
testing models involved a more comprehensive set of variables at the CEO, firm and 
environmental levels.  
Another contribution of my study is the finding that CEO political ideology is a critical 
determinant of a firm’s innovation trajectory. On one hand, liberal CEOs lead firms toward a 
departure from firms’ existing technology and exploration in new technology domains, 
encouraging research endeavors that enhance fundamental understating about phenomena, with 
benefits that go beyond the focal firms. Such innovation trajectory is uncertain and long-term 
but, as my findings also demonstrated, is more likely to result in breakthrough innovations that 
revolutionize current markets and technologies. On the other hand, my results show that more 
conservative CEOs direct firms towards incrementally improving and refining current 
technology. They tend to encourage research endeavors that are more certain and have more 
proximate practical results for their firms. These results are consistent with prior research 
showing that conservative CEOs establish more certain and less risky policies (Christensen et al., 
2015; Hutton et al., 2014). Conservative CEOs’ innovation strategy is more predictable and 
generates results in the short term, but it is less likely to bring about breakthroughs, and such 
strategies may lead to inertia and impede firms’ adaptation to environmental changes (Levinthal, 
1991). Future research can explore the consequences of different strategic-direction pursuits by 
liberal and conservative CEOs on firms’ flexibility and adaptation capability.  
While risky and exploratory strategies increase the risk of failure, contrary to my 
predictions I found no evidence that firms with liberal CEOs develop more failure innovations. 
One explanation for this finding could be existence of other factors that offset the danger of 
                                                          
21 Hutton et al., (2014) controlled for Tobin’s Q, firm size, leverage and earning performance and included year and 
industry fixed effects.  
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R&D project riskiness undertaken by firms with liberal CEOs. One possible factor could be the 
diversity of inventors in firms led by liberal CEOs that not only increases the amount of available 
information, knowledge, and skills (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999) but enhances the range of 
thinking styles and perspectives that contribute to the research process, potentially improving 
information processing and decision-making quality (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 
2004). Prior research consistently shows that greater diversity in innovation teams increases 
innovation quality (Díaz-García, González-Moreno, & Sáez-Martínez, 2013; Garcia Martinez, 
Zouaghi, & Garcia Marco, 2017). As the two last hypotheses of this study demonstrate, the 
existence of a liberal CEO tends to increase the presence and participation of female scientists. 
The increased diversity in innovation teams in such firms is likely to translate into enhanced 
innovation quality. Another possible factor for the null finding on the effect of liberal CEOs on 
failure innovations could be the quality of inventors working in such firms. Research shows that 
high-quality (star) inventors actively seek out employers with promising working conditions 
(Moretti & Wilson, 2017), and it is likely that the policies and practices established by liberal 
CEOs that encourage equality (Carnahan & Greenwood, 2018; Chin & Semadeni, 2017), 
diversity (Chin et al., 2013), and less performance-based pay (Gupta & Wowak, 2017), along 
with their own openness and receptivity to new ideas, may make such firms more favorable 
workplaces for star inventors whose presence reduces the likelihood of developing low-quality 
(failure) innovations (Hohberger, 2016). Future research could explore these and other factors 
that help liberal CEOs avoid failure trap while pursuing risky innovation projects.  
Innovation literature 
My study also has several implications for innovation literature. First, it shows that CEO 
liberalism is a strong predictor of breakthrough innovation. Breakthroughs have a key role in 
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changing technological trajectories and disrupting current markets. This type of innovation can 
provide firms with a unique competitive advantage and serve as a significant source of value 
both for firms and the broader society (Hall et al., 2005). Therefore, understanding the 
determinants of breakthroughs is important from both theoretical and practical standpoints 
(Ahuja & Lampert, 2001) and has long been a central inquiry in innovation literature (Kaplan & 
Vakili, 2015; Phene et al., 2006). Only a few studies to date have examined CEO-related 
antecedents of breakthroughs (Cho & Kim, 2017; Lee et al., 2020) and my study is the first that 
points to CEOs’ deeply held ideological beliefs as a key determinant of such innovations.  
My second contribution to innovation literature is establishing CEO ideological 
orientation as a determinant of the choice between exploration and exploitation. Since these 
concepts were introduced by March (1991), several studies have explored factors that determine 
the choice between them (Wilden et al., 2018; Lavie et al., 2010). While March’s propositions 
were inherently behavioral, subsequent studies mostly neglected the behavioral and 
psychological determinants of exploration vs exploitation (Wilden et al., 2018). Particularly, the 
role of behavioral tendencies of CEOs in these strategies has not been studied. I advanced this 
literature stream by theorizing and empirically showing that the innovation endeavors of firms 
led by liberal CEOs are more likely to explore new technological domains.  
My study makes an additional contribution to innovation literature by helping to answer 
the question “why do firms do basic research?” Basic research is conducted to discover new 
knowledge and, contrary to applied research, is often undertaken without specific commercial 
applications in mind. It involves highly uncertain and long-term research endeavors the benefits 
of which are often not completely appropriable by the firm undertaking it (Rosenberg, 1990), 
making businesses usually reluctant to pursue such research. I provided evidence for my 
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prediction that, due to their inherent curiosity and broad perspectives about the role of businesses 
in the society, liberal CEOs are more likely to encourage the pursuit of basic research. To my 
knowledge, this study is the first that shows the role of CEOs in a firm’s tendency to conduct 
basic research.  
Gender diversity literature 
This study has important implications for the literature stream related to gender diversity 
in the workplace, specifically in innovative jobs. While prior research provides ample evidence 
that gender diversity in innovation teams enhances innovation capability and performance (Díaz-
García et al., 2013; Garcia Martinez et al., 2017; Xie, Zhou, Zong, & Lu, 2020), there is still a 
significant gap both in academia and industry with respect to the presence of females in 
innovative jobs and related commercial activities (Whittington, 2018). Although research on the 
antecedents of this gap in the industry sector is very limited, there is some evidence that firms are 
often not welcoming towards female scientists (Murray & Graham, 2007). My study 
demonstrates the role of CEO liberalism in welcoming the presence of female inventors in firms, 
even after controlling for several possible antecedents related to firm, industry, and location. I 
also found that in firms led by liberal CEOs, females participate in innovation teams in higher 
proportions, providing more evidence about the confidence in the capabilities of female scientists 
that exists in such firms. These results are also consistent with prior research on the impact of 
liberal orientation of decision-makers on gender equality (Briscoe & Joshi 2017; Carnahan & 
Greenwood, 2018; Chin et al., 2013). While a group of these studies focused on 
supervisors/managers’ political ideology (Briscoe & Joshi 2017; Carnahan & Greenwood, 2018) 
and others studied it indirectly through CSR efforts (Chin et al., 2013), my study provides both 
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theory and evidence that the political ideology of CEOs as the top leader of firms decreases the 
gender gap in the hiring and selection of highly-skilled human capital.  
Additional opportunities for future research 
In addition to the ideas for future research presented above, my dissertation suggests 
several other lines of future inquiry: 
First, while my study focused on the effect of CEO ideology, future research may examine 
the implication of the political orientation of the entire TMT with respect to a firm’s innovation. 
This would be an important inquiry because TMTs are the most influential executives of firms, 
with a substantial role in determining firms’ strategies, including innovation (Hambrick, 2015; 
Heyden et al., 2017; Kor, 2006). Another interesting research question that could guide future 
research is the role of board members’ political ideology. While the board of directors has been 
shown to have a role in shaping firms’ innovation (Balsmeier et al., 2017; Bravo & Reguera‐
Alvarado, 2017), we still do not know whether their political ideologies impact innovation. It 
would be specifically interesting to study the joint effect of CEO and TMT/board ideologies to 
examine whether they have complementary or substitutive effects on innovation. 
A second potentially fruitful avenue for future research pertains to delving deeper into the 
effect of CEOs’ political ideology on the management of high skilled human capital. In this 
study, I took the first step by showing that CEO liberalism tends to increase the presence of 
female scientists, and future research could consider whether the different values of liberal and 
conservative CEOs have implications with respect to the type of human capital that firms attract 
and retain (Schneider, 1987). Specifically, researchers could examine the presence of star 
inventors in firms led by liberal vs conservative CEOs. Star inventors are a small number of 
highly influential scientists that develop a large proportion of knowledge and have a remarkable 
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impact on the technological progress (Zucker, Darby, & Torero, 2002). They can account for a 
substantial portion of a firm’s innovation capabilities and intellectual capital and can provide 
firms with a myriad of advantages such as enhanced innovation productivity and transfer of 
knowledge to other inventors (Azoulay et al., 2011; Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015; Zucker & Darby, 
1997). Star inventors are therefore an important resource for any firm and investigating the 
determinants of their presence in firms has important theoretical and practical implications. As 
mentioned earlier, it is likely that the inherent motivation of liberal CEOs to explore and exhibit 
receptivity towards new ideas as well as the nature of their policies (promoting diversity, 
equality, less performance-based pay, etc.) may attract and retain star inventors (Schneider, 
1987). As another opportunity for future research, researchers could examine the intersection of 
CEO political ideology and inventors’ mobility. Inventors are key talents whose human capital 
serves as an important source of competitive advantage for firms. Firms make substantial 
investments to hire and retain such highly skilled human capital and losing them can be a major 
cost. Moreover, the mobility of inventors has been shown to be a prominent source of knowledge 
dissemination and spillover between firms (Arrow, 1962; Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003). The fact 
that leaving inventors may join rival firms and transfer their valuable skills and technological 
knowledge to them makes losing them even more costly. As a result, understanding the 
antecedents of inventor mobility has been a central research inquiry with implications for both 
research and practice. Future research can examine whether the different attitudes of liberal and 
conservative CEOs towards novel ideas and the different human resource management policies 
they establish are among factors that inventors consider when deciding about taking employment 
in a firm.  
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Finally, most studies on the implications of CEO political ideology (including this study) 
have conceptualized CEO ideology as a set of values and orientations that shape their decisions 
(Swigart et al., 2020). I suggest that political ideology also can be considered as a dimension of 
CEO human capital (i.e., knowledge, skills, ability and other characteristics). Such 
conceptualization can open fruitful lines of research. For example, future studies could integrate 
the literature on political ideology and CEO-organization fit (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 
2009). CEOs may have a repertoire of human capital that make them suited for one context but 
not for another (Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Finkelstein et al., 2009), and it seems likely that, due 
to their different preferences, conservative or liberal CEOs can deliver better performance in 
specific contexts. For example, research demonstrates that exploratory innovation is more 
effective in dynamic environments while exploitative innovation is more beneficial in 
competitive environments (Jansen, et al., 2006). Given the results of my study showing the 
different innovation strategies that liberal and conservative CEOs prefer to pursue, researchers 
can examine the performance differences of firms led by liberal vs conservative CEOs in these 
contexts.  
Practical Implications  
From a practical standpoint, my dissertation has special implications for the board of 
directors. One major responsibility of board members is selecting a CEO, and the results of my 
study have potential to inform this decision. I provide evidence that liberal and conservative 
CEOs have different preferences about the direction and trajectory of research efforts and 
innovation, and these different trajectories are likely to have implications for firms’ competitive 
advantages and performance as well as for their flexibility and adaptation. Unlike other traits of 
CEOs such as personality, their political orientation is observable before they take office, thus 
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when selecting a CEO, a board of directors should carefully examine the fit between the desired 
direction and the contextual conditions of the firm and an incoming CEO’s political ideology and 
select a CEO whose preferences are in alignment with the firm’s specific circumstances.  
Limitations 
As with any empirical research study, my study has limitations that require some 
refinements and extensions. First, although using donations to political parties to operationalize 
political ideology is a well-established approach in the literature, it is certainly not a precise 
approach for measuring an individual’s complex psychological attitudes. Future research can 
benefit from more precise methods such as surveys and interviews as well as textual analysis of 
executives’ statements for measuring their political ideology.  
Moreover, although patents are a widely-accepted proxy of innovation used in the 
innovation literature (Sunder et al., 2017), there is a limitation to using them because, for 
example, not all innovations are patented or can be patented (Hall, Helmers, Mogers, Sena & 
2014). Firms may also prefer to use other means of protecting their intellectual property (e.g., 
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, etc.). Future research can benefit from other measurement 
approaches such as text-based techniques (Bellstam, Bhagat, & Cookson, 2020) that do not have 
the limitations represented by patents.  
Furthermore, I acknowledge that alternative explanations might exist for my findings. To 
rule out such explanations I included a set of control variables related to CEO, firm and the 
environment and used a lagged design in which the independent (CEO liberalism) and control 
variables precede the dependent variables to eliminate the possibility of recursive relationships 
between independent and dependent variables. However, it is possible that CEOs do not 
volitionally act on their ideology but are selected and attracted to firms that fit their values 
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(Schneider, 1987). Therefore, the results I have obtained so far may be because of the propensity 
of firms with specific attributes (certain innovation outcomes and strategies) to hire liberal CEOs 
and/or the tendency of liberals to lead such firms and not because of the CEOs’ liberal values 
and preferences. Therefore, future research needs to account for this endogenous matching.  
Finally, my measurement of basic research can certainly be improved on in future 
research. Because it is almost impossible to measure the fraction of R&D endeavors devoted to 
basic and applied research using archival data, I considered the number of citations to scientific 
papers and the number of government-funded innovations as proxies for basic research 
endeavors. Another approach to operationalizing basic research could be focusing on scientific 
papers published by a firm and grouping them into basic or applied categories considering the 
nature of the journals in which they are published (Lim, 2000). Future research could benefit 
from this approach or other more precise measurements of basic research. 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the influence of CEO political ideology 
for firm innovation. Specifically, it aimed to assess how the political ideology of CEOs impacts 
the outcomes of innovation and how it impacts the strategies of innovation in firms. I showed 
that CEOs’ liberal or conservative orientation is influential for the direction and trajectory of 
firms’ innovation and the quality of innovations they develop while it does not impact the 
quantity of their innovations.  
  
 
95 
 
APPENDIX A. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL  
Table A.1. Review of Research on CEO Characteristics and Innovation 
Study (s) CEO attribute Key findings  
Yadav, Prabhu & 
Chandy (2007) 
Attention 
CEOs that focus their attention on future and on external entities foster 
innovation in their firms.  
Nadkarni & Chen 
(2014) 
Temporal focus 
When a CEO’s temporal focus (past, present, future) is consistent with 
the demand of the environment, it enhances the rate of NPIs. For 
instance, in stable environments, CEOs with past temporal focus and 
those with present focus enhance the rate of NPIs. 
Miller, Kets De 
Vries & Toulouse 
(1982) 
- Miller & Toulouse 
(1986) 
Locus of 
control 
CEOs with internal locus of control pursue more product and service 
innovations and introduce new products more frequently. CEOs with 
such personality trait also place greater emphasis on R&D and change 
their product line more dramatically.  
Galasso and 
Simcoe (2011) 
Overconfidence 
Because an overconfident CEO underestimates the likelihood of failure, 
he/she is more likely to innovate. And CEOs’ overconfidence is 
associated with higher innovations quality specifically when they have 
more discretion and when competition is more intense.  
Hirshleifer, Low & 
Teoh (2012) 
Overconfidence 
overconfident CEOs invest more in research and development (R&D) 
and for a given R&D expenditure they generate more innovation outputs 
(more patents and patent citation counts). This effect is stronger in more 
innovative industries.  
Tang, Li & Yang, 
2015 
Hubris 
hubristic CEOs foster firms’ innovation but their effect on innovation is 
weaker in in more munificent and complex environments. 
Sunder, Sunder & 
Zhang (2017) 
Sensation 
seeking  
Firms with pilot CEOs (who are high in sensation seeking) have higher 
number of patent applications, their patents are of higher quality and are 
more diverse and original. Further, market reacts more favorably to 
patents created by pilot CEOs. 
Zhang, Ou, Tsui & 
Wang (2017) 
Humility 
& narcissism 
CEOs who are both humble and narcissistic foster innovation. Because 
such CEOs tend to exploit the existing knowledge and explore new 
knowledge at the same time.  
Barker & Mueller 
(2002) 
- Prior 
experiences 
- Demographics 
Younger CEOs and those with prior experiences in R&D/engineering 
and those who worked in sales/marketing spend more on R&D. 
However, CEOs with prior career in legal or production/operations 
areas tend to invest less in R&D.  
Custódio, Ferreira 
& Matos (2019) 
Generalist vs 
specialist  
Generalist CEOs are those whose human capital is not firm-specific and 
is transferable across different firms and industries. Firms with 
generalist CEOs have higher innovation productivity (measured by the 
number of patents and the number of patent citations). Additionally, 
generalist CEOs engage more in exploratory innovation than 
exploitative innovation. 
Berson, Oreg & 
Dvir (2008) 
Self-Directive, 
Supportive & 
Benevolent 
Values 
CEOs with self-directive values promote innovation-oriented culture in 
their firm and consequently enhance sales growth.  
Kashmiri & 
Mahajan (2017) 
Political 
Ideology  
Firms with more liberal CEOs have higher rate of NPIs. When CEOs 
have greater equity-based compensation, when marketing department 
has higher influence over TMT and when the economy is growing the 
association between CEOs’ liberalism and rate of NPIs is weaker. But 
CEO power enhances the effect of political ideology on NPI.  
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Table A.2. Negative Binomial Regressions Predicting the Effect of CEO Liberalism on Innovation Outcomes and Strategies 
 Number of patents Breakthroughs New knowledge1 New technology Citation to science  Government funded 
2  
 
Model  
1 
Model 
 2 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
 9 
Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model  
14 
Model  
15 
Model  
16 
Model 
 17 
                 
R&D intensity 0.824** 0.630** 0.336 2.460** 2.170** 2.321** 0.864** 0.910** 0.910** 0.918** 0.644+ 0.919** 0.944** 0.681** -2.415 -1.031 
 (0.223) (0.234) (0.262) (0.536) (0.585) (0.609) (0.315) (0.339) (0.321) (0.340) (0.369) (0.199) (0.214) (0.260) (1.560) (1.426) 
                 
Leverage -0.085 -0.327** -0.251* -0.010 -0.099 0.021 -0.280* -0.528** -0.310* -0.333* -0.288+ -0.161 -0.346* -0.259+ -0.344 -0.520 
 (0.099) (0.105) (0.112) (0.209) (0.229) (0.235) (0.127) (0.135) (0.131) (0.139) (0.151) (0.143) (0.151) (0.156) (0.610) (0.652) 
                 
Firm size 0.348** 0.341** 0.321** 0.486** 0.440** 0.406** 0.462** 0.462** 0.357** 0.336** 0.323** 0.320** 0.309** 0.286** 0.535** 0.532** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.044) (0.046) (0.050) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.079) (0.081) 
                 
ROA 0.487 1.124 -1.090 -0.600 -1.256 -1.015 1.679* -26.892+ 1.229+ 1.438+ 0.035 2.007** 3.097** -0.514 -173.560 -172.588 
 (0.682) (0.794) (2.327) (6.090) (9.020) (7.596) (0.797) (15.469) (0.665) (0.742) (1.955) (0.598) (0.935) (1.837) (112.017) (121.727) 
                 
Tobin's Q 0.010* 0.010** 0.013** 0.018** 0.020** 0.021** 0.001 0.002 0.017** 0.009+ 0.018** 0.030** 0.032** 0.028** -0.049 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.045) (0.038) 
                 
Institutional 
ownership 
0.033** 0.028** 0.022** 0.025** 0.016** 0.017** 0.023** 0.024** 0.019** 0.018** 0.013** 0.044** 0.039** 0.033** 0.032* 0.045** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.016) 
                 
CEO Vega 0.031 0.045+ 0.071+ 0.074+ 0.039 0.059 0.054* 0.060* 0.053 0.039 0.044 0.006 0.017 0.054 0.069 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.042) (0.052) (0.061) (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.038) (0.043) (0.031) (0.035) (0.043) (0.077) (0.115) 
                 
CEO age -0.029+ -0.009 -0.008 0.006 0.029 0.007 -0.041* -0.019 0.023 -0.015 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.037 0.041 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.077) (0.086) 
                 
CEO duality -0.058+ -0.082* -
0.120** 
0.040 0.067 0.085 -0.006 -0.031 -0.003 -0.010 -0.093+ -0.113* -0.066 -0.083 
0.168 0.184 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.083) (0.089) (0.096) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.053) (0.050) (0.053) (0.058) (0.178) (0.195) 
                 
CEO tenure -0.009** -0.012** -0.012** -0.009 -0.012* -0.008 -0.003 -0.007* -0.009** -0.009** -0.008* -0.012** -0.012** -0.009* -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.013) 
                 
CEO ownership 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.012** 0.007 -0.019 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.017) (0.020) 
                 
CEO liberalism 0.022 0.059 0.066 0.545** 0.558** 0.605** -0.026 0.020 0.183* 0.068 0.087 0.102 0.112 0.084 1.051** 0.772* 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.069) (0.142) (0.153) (0.170) (0.069) (0.075) (0.074) (0.081) (0.089) (0.071) (0.077) (0.083) (0.289) (0.300) 
                 
Constant -1.049 -0.038 -1.584 0.806 -0.232 0.961 -0.471 -0.717 0.450 0.902 -0.432 -1.726* -1.684+ -2.460* -1.350 -22.457 
 (0.702) (1.019) (1.153) (1.114) (1.279) (1.266) (0.773) (0.815) (0.665) (0.704) (0.969) (0.707) (0.876) (1.161) (2.167) (30032.32) 
                 
Observations 4736 4262 3,797 4729 4250 3781 4729 4250 4729 4250 3781 4729 4250 3781 4250 3781 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Models including only control variables are not shown in this table.   
Standard errors in parentheses (+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) 
1-Models with 1- and 2-year lags are reported.  
2-Models with 2- and 3-year lags are reported. 
 
97 
 
 REFERENCES 
Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. 1996. Research and development in the growth process. Journal of 
Economic Growth, 1(1): 49-73. 
Aghion, P., Van Reenen, J., & Zingales, L. 2013. Innovation and institutional ownership. 
American Economic Review, 103(1): 277-304. 
Ahuja, G. 2000. Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: A longitudinal study. 
Administrative science quarterly, 45(3): 425-455. 
Ahuja, G, Lampert, CM. 2001. Entrepreneurship in the large corporation: A longitudinal study of 
how established firms create breakthrough inventions, Strategic Management Journal, 
22: 521-543. 
Ansolabehere, S., De Figueiredo, J. M., & Snyder Jr, J. M. 2003. Why is there so little money in 
US politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(1): 105-130. 
Arrow, K. 1962. The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies, 
29: 155-173. 
Arora, A., Belenzon, S., & Sheer, L. 2017. Back to basics: why do firms invest in research? (No. 
w23187). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Artz, K. W., Norman, P. M., Hatfield, D. E., & Cardinal, L. B. (2010). A longitudinal study of 
the impact of R&D, patents, and product innovation on firm performance. Journal of 
product innovation management, 27(5), 725-740. 
Augier, M., & Teece, D. J. 2009. Dynamic capabilities and the role of managers in business 
strategy and economic performance. Organization science, 20(2): 410-421. 
Azoulay, P., Graff Zivin, J. S., & Manso, G. 2011. Incentives and creativity: evidence from the 
academic life sciences. The RAND Journal of Economics, 42(3): 527-554. 
Balsmeier, B., & Buchwald, A. 2015. Who promotes more innovations? Inside versus outside 
hired CEOs. Industrial and Corporate Change, 24(5): 1013-1045. 
Balsmeier, B., Fleming, L., & Manso, G. 2017. Independent boards and innovation. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 123(3): 536-557. 
Baregheh, A., Rowley, J., & Sambrook, S. 2009. Towards a multidisciplinary definition of 
innovation. Management Decision, 47(8): 1323-1339. 
Barker III, V. L., & Mueller, G. C. 2002. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending. 
Management Science, 48(6): 782-801. 
Becker, G. S. 1985. Human capital, effort, and the sexual division of labor. Journal of labor 
economics, 3(1, Part 2): 33-58. 
 
98 
 
Bellstam, G., Bhagat, S., & Cookson, J. A. 2020. A text-based analysis of corporate innovation. 
Management Science. Articles in advance  
Benner, M. J., & Tushman, M. 2002. Process management and technological innovation: A 
longitudinal study of the photography and paint industries. Administrative science 
quarterly, 47(4): 676-707. 
Benner, M. J., & Tushman, M. L. 2003. Exploitation, exploration, and process management: The 
productivity dilemma revisited. Academy of Management Review, 28(2): 238-256. 
Berger, R., Dutta, S., Raffel, T., & Samuels, G. 2008. Innovating at the top: how global CEOs 
drive innovation for growth and profit. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bermiss, Y. S., & McDonald, R. 2018. Ideological misfit? Political affiliation and employee 
departure in the private-equity industry. Academy of Management Journal, 61(6): 2182-
2209. 
Berson, Y., Oreg, S., & Dvir, T. 2008. CEO values, organizational culture and firm outcomes. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 29(5): 615-633. 
Bhagat, S., & Welch, I. 1995. Corporate research & development investments international 
comparisons. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(2-3): 443-470. 
Bolzendahl, C. I., & Myers, D. J. 2004. Feminist attitudes and support for gender equality: 
Opinion change in women and men, 1974–1998. Social forces, 83(2), 759-789. 
Bonica, Adam. 2016. Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections: Public version 2.0 
[Computer file]. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Libraries. 
Bowen, F. E., Rostami, M., & Steel, P. 2010. Timing is everything: A meta-analysis of the 
relationships between organizational performance and innovation. Journal of Business 
Research, 63(11): 1179-1185. 
Bravo, F., & Reguera‐Alvarado, N. 2017. The effect of board of directors on R&D intensity: 
board tenure and multiple directorships. R&D Management, 47(5): 701-714. 
Briscoe, F., Chin, M. K., & Hambrick, D. C. 2014. CEO ideology as an element of the corporate 
opportunity structure for social activists. Academy of Management Journal, 57(6): 1786-
1809. 
Briscoe, F., & Joshi, A. 2017. Bringing the boss’s politics in: Supervisor political ideology and 
the gender gap in earnings. Academy of Management Journal, 60(4): 1415-1441. 
Burris V. 2001. The two faces of capital: corporations and individual capitalists as political 
actors. American Sociological Review, 66: 361–381. 
Cabral, L. M. 2003. R&D competition when firms choose variance. Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy, 12(1): 139-150. 
 
99 
 
Camisón-Zornoza, C., Lapiedra-Alcamí, R., Segarra-Ciprés, M., & Boronat-Navarro, M. 2004. A 
meta-analysis of innovation and organizational size. Organization studies, 25(3): 331-
361. 
Carnahan, S., & Greenwood, B. N. 2018. Managers’ political beliefs and gender inequality 
among subordinates: Does his ideology matter more than hers? Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 63(2): 287-322. 
Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. 2008. The secret lives of liberals and 
conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they leave behind. 
Political Psychology, 29: 807–840. 
Carpenter, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. 2002. Top management team compensation: The missing 
link between CEO pay and firm performance? Strategic management journal, 23(4): 367-
375. 
Cecere, L. 2013. New products: More costly and more important. 11 December, https://www. 
forbes. com/sites/loracecere/2013/12/11/new-products-more-costly-and-more-important. 
Chadwick, C., Super, J. F., & Kwon, K. 2015. Resource orchestration in practice: CEO emphasis 
on SHRM, commitment‐based HR systems, and firm performance. Strategic 
Management Journal, 36(3): 360-376. 
Chatterji, Aaron K., and Michael W. Toffel. 2018.The new CEO activists. HBR’s 10 Must: 47-
65.  
Chen, G., & Hambrick, D. C. 2012. CEO replacement in turnaround situations: Executive (mis) 
fit and its performance implications. Organization Science, 23(1): 225-243. 
Chin, M. K., Hambrick, D. C., & Trevino, L. K. 2013. Political Ideologies of CEOs: The 
Influence of Executives’ Values on Corporate Social Responsibility. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 58(2): 197–232. 
Chin, M. K., & Semadeni, M. 2017. CEO political ideologies and pay egalitarianism within top 
management teams. Strategic Management Journal, 38(8): 1608-1625. 
Cho, S. Y., & Kim, S. K. 2017. Horizon problem and firm innovation: The influence of CEO 
career horizon, exploitation and exploration on breakthrough innovations. Research 
Policy, 46(10): 1801-1809. 
Christensen, D. M., Dhaliwal, D. S., Boivie, S., & Graffin, S. D. 2015. Top management 
conservatism and corporate risk strategies: Evidence from managers' personal political 
orientation and corporate tax avoidance. Strategic Management Journal, 36(12): 1918-
1938. 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. 2006. Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of 
financial Economics, 79(2): 431-468. 
 
100 
 
Core, J., Guay, W., 2002. Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their 
sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 40: 613-630. 
Correll, S. J., Benard, S., & Paik, I. 2007. Getting a job: Is there a motherhood penalty? 
American Journal of Sociology, 112, 1297-1338. 
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. 2009. Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic 
literature, 47(2): 448-74. 
Crossan, M. M., & Apaydin, M. 2010. A multi‐dimensional framework of organizational 
innovation: A systematic review of the literature. Journal of Management Studies, 47(6): 
1154-1191. 
Cohen, A., Hazan, M., Tallarita, R., & Weiss, D. 2019. The Politics of CEOs. Journal of Legal 
Analysis, 1: 1-45. 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Administrative science quarterly, 35: 128-152. 
Conti, R. 2014. Do non‐competition agreements lead firms to pursue risky R&D projects?. 
Strategic Management Journal, 35(8): 1230-1248. 
Costa Jr, P. T., McCrae, R. R., & Dye, D. A. (1991). Facet scales for agreeableness and 
conscientiousness: A revision of the NEO Personality Inventory. Personality and 
individual Differences, 12(9), 887-898. 
Custódio, C., Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. 2019. Do general managerial skills spur innovation?. 
Management Science, 65(2): 459-476. 
Czarnitzki, D., & Thorwarth, S. 2012. Productivity effects of basic research in low-tech and 
high-tech industries. Research Policy, 41(9): 1555-1564. 
Davis, S. N., & Greenstein, T. N.2009. Gender ideology: Components, predictors, and 
consequences. Annual review of Sociology, 35, 87-105. 
Delgado M. Mariani M. and Murray F. E. 2019. The role of location on the inventor gender gap: 
women are geographically constrained. Paper presented at DRUID19 Conference., 
Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 19-21 
DeVault, L., & Sias, R. 2017. Hedge fund politics and portfolios. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
75: 80-97. 
Dezsö, C. L., & Ross, D. G. 2012. Does female representation in top management improve firm 
performance? A panel data investigation. Strategic management journal, 33(9): 1072-
1089. 
 
101 
 
Dezsö, C. L., Ross, D. G., & Uribe, J. 2016. Is there an implicit quota on women in top 
management? A large‐sample statistical analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 37(1): 
98-115. 
DiGiuli, A., & Kostovetsky, L. 2014. Are red or blue companies more likely to go green? 
Politics and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Financial Economics, 111(1): 158-
180. 
DiMasi, J. A. 2000. New drug innovation and pharmaceutical industry structure: trends in the 
output of pharmaceutical firms. Drug information journal: DIJ/Drug Information 
Association, 34(4): 1169-1194. 
Ding, W. W., Murray, F., & Stuart, T. E. 2013. From bench to board: Gender differences in 
university scientists' participation in corporate scientific advisory boards. Academy of 
Management Journal, 56(5): 1443-1464. 
Díaz-García, C., González-Moreno, A., & Jose Saez-Martinez, F. 2013. Gender diversity within 
R&D teams: Its impact on radicalness of innovation. Innovation, 15(2): 149-160. 
Duffin, E., 2019. Higher education graduation in the U.S. - Statistics & Facts. 
https://www.statista.com/topics/2245/higher-education-graduation-in-the-us/ 
Duque, R. B., Ynalvez, M., Sooryamoorthy, R., Mbatia, P., Dzorgbo, D. B. S., & Shrum, W. 
2005. Collaboration paradox: Scientific productivity, the Internet, and problems of 
research in developing areas. Social studies of science, 35(5): 755-785. 
Dyer, J., Gregersen, H., & Christensen, C. M. 2011. The innovator's DNA: Mastering the five 
skills of disruptive innovators. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Elnahas, A. M., & Kim, D. 2017. CEO political ideology and mergers and acquisitions decisions. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 45: 162-175. 
England, G. W. 1967. Personal value systems of American managers. Academy of Management 
Journal, 10(1): 53-68. 
Erikson, R. S., Tedin, K. L.2003. American Public Opinion, 6th ed. New York: Longman. 
Fleming, L. (2001). Recombinant uncertainty in technological search. Management science, 
47(1): 117-132. 
Francia, P. L., Green, J. C., Herrnson, P. S., Powell, L. W., & Wilcox, C. 2005. Limousine 
liberals and corporate conservatives: The financial constituencies of the democratic and 
republican parties. Social Science Quarterly, 86(4): 761-778. 
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., Sun, X., & Wu, Q. 2016. CEO political preference and corporate tax 
sheltering. Journal of Corporate Finance, 38:37-53. 
Feist, G. J. 1998. A meta-analysis of personality in scientific and artistic creativity. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 4: 290-309. 
 
102 
 
Fenton‐O'Creevy, M. 2001. Employee involvement and the middle manager: saboteur or 
scapegoat? Human Resource Management Journal, 11(1): 24-40. 
Finkelstein, S. 1992. Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and 
validation. Academy of Management Journal, 35(3): 505-538. 
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C., Cannella, B. 2009. Strategic leadership: Theory and 
research on executives, top management teams, and boards. Oxford University Press. 
Fremeth, A., Richter, B. K., & Schaufele, B. 2013. Campaign contributions over CEOs' careers. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(3): 170-88. 
Galasso, A., & Simcoe, T. S. 2011. CEO overconfidence and innovation. Management Science, 
57(8): 1469-1484. 
Garcia Martinez, M., Zouaghi, F., & Garcia Marco, T. 2017. Diversity is strategy: the effect of 
R&D team diversity on innovative performance. R&D Management, 47(2): 311-329. 
Gaughan, M., & Corley, E. A. 2010. Science faculty at US research universities: The impacts of 
university research center-affiliation and gender on industrial activities. Technovation, 
30(3): 215-222. 
Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., & Dowling, C. M. 2011. The big five personality traits 
in the political arena. Annual Review of Political Science, 14: 265-287. 
Gopalakrishnan, S., & Damanpour, F.1997. A review of innovation research in economics, 
sociology and technology management. Omega, 25(1), 15-28. 
Graffin, S. D., Hubbard, T. D., Christensen, D. M., & Lee, E. Y. 2020. The influence of CEO 
risk tolerance on initial pay packages. Strategic Management Journal, 41(4): 788-811. 
Griliches, Z. 1986. Productivity, R&D, and basic research at the firm level in the 1970s (No. 
w1547). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gupta, A., & Briscoe, F. 2020. Organizational Political Ideology and Corporate Openness to 
Social Activism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 65(2): 524–563.  
Gupta, A., Briscoe, F., & Hambrick, D. C. 2017. Red, blue, and purple firms: Organizational 
political ideology and corporate social responsibility. Strategic Management Journal, 
38(5): 1018-1040. 
Gupta, A., Briscoe, F., & Hambrick, D. C. 2018. Evenhandedness in resource allocation: Its 
relationship with CEO ideology, organizational discretion, and firm 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 61(5): 1848-1868. 
Gupta, A. K., Tesluk, P. E., & Taylor, M. S. 2007. Innovation at and across multiple levels of 
analysis. Organization Science, 18(6): 885-897. 
 
103 
 
Gupta, A., Nadkarni, S., & Mariam, M. 2019. Dispositional sources of managerial discretion: 
CEO ideology, CEO personality, and firm strategies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
64 (4): 855-893.  
Gupta, A., & Wowak, A. J. 2017. The elephant (or donkey) in the boardroom: How board 
political ideology affects CEO pay. Administrative Science Quarterly, 62(1): 1-30. 
Haines, E. L., Deaux, K., & Lofaro, N. 2016. The times they are a-changing… or are they not? A 
comparison of gender stereotypes, 1983–2014. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 40(3): 
353-363. 
Hall, B. H., Jaffe, A., & Trajtenberg, M. 2005. Market Value and Patent Citations. The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 36(1): 16-38. 
Hall, B., C. Helmers, M. Rogers, and V. Sena. 2014. The choice between formal and informal 
intellectual property: A review. Journal of Economic Literature, 52:375–423. 
Hambrick, Donald C. 2015. Top management teams. Wiley Encyclopedia of Management: 1-2.  
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its 
top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 193-206. 
He, Z. L., & Wong, P. K. 2004. Exploration vs. exploitation: An empirical test of the 
ambidexterity hypothesis. Organization science, 15(4): 481-494. 
Henard, D. H., & McFadyen, M. A. 2005. The complementary roles of applied and basic 
research: a knowledge‐based perspective. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 
22(6): 503-514. 
Heyden, M. L., Reimer, M., & Van Doorn, S. 2017. Innovating beyond the horizon: CEO career 
horizon, top management composition, and R&D intensity. Human Resource 
Management, 56(2): 205-224. 
Hibbing, J. R., Smith, K. B., & Alford, J. R. 2014. Differences in negativity bias underlie 
variations in political ideology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37(3): 297-307.  
Hirshleifer, D., Low, A., & Teoh, S. H. 2012. Are overconfident CEOs better innovators? The 
Journal of Finance, 67(4): 1457-1498. 
Hohberger, J. 2016. Does it pay to stand on the shoulders of giants? An analysis of the inventions 
of star inventors in the biotechnology sector. Research Policy, 45(3): 682-698. 
Hoisl, K., & Mariani, M.2017. It’sa man’s job: Income and the gender gap in industrial research. 
Management Science, 63(3): 766-790. 
Hong, H., & Kostovetsky, L.2012. Red and blue investing: Values and finance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 103(1): 1-19. 
 
104 
 
Hughes, A., 2017. 5 facts about U.S. political donations. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/05/17/5-facts-about-u-s-political-donations/ 
Hutton, I., Jiang, D., & Kumar, A. 2014. Corporate policies of Republican managers. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49(5-6): 1279-1310. 
Hutton, I., Jiang, D., & Kumar, A. 2015. Political values, culture, and corporate litigation. 
Management Science, 61(12): 2905-2925. 
Islam, E., & Zein, J. 2020. Inventor CEOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 135(2), 505-527. 
Jehn, K. A., Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. 1999. Why differences make a difference: A field 
study of diversity, conflict and performance in workgroups. Administrative science 
quarterly, 44(4): 741-763. 
Jansen, J. J., Van Den Bosch, F. A., & Volberda, H. W. 2006. Exploratory innovation, 
exploitative innovation, and performance: Effects of organizational antecedents and 
environmental moderators. Management science, 52(11): 1661-1674. 
Joel, S., Burton, C. M., & Plaks, J. E. 2014. Conservatives anticipate and experience stronger 
emotional reactions to negative outcomes. Journal of Personality, 82(1): 32-43. 
Jones, J. M. 2009.State of the states: political party affiliation. Gallop, 28 January. 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/114016/state-states-political-party-affiliation.aspx  
Jones, J. M. 2019. Conservatives greatly outnumber liberals in 19 US states. Gallup, 22 
February. https://news.gallup.com/poll/247016/conservatives-greatly-outnumber-liberals-
states.aspx 
Jost, J. T. 2006. The end of the end of ideology. American Psychologist, 61(7): 651. 
Jost, J. T. 2017. Ideological asymmetries and the essence of political psychology. Political 
psychology, 38(2): 167-208. 
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. 2009. Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and 
elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 307-337. 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. 2003. Political conservatism as 
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3): 339-375. 
Jost, J. T., Sterling, J., & Stern, C. 2017. Getting closure on conservatism, or the politics of 
epistemic and existential motivation. In C. Kopetz & A. Fishbach (Eds.), The motivation-
cognition interface; From the lab to the real world: A Festschrift in honor of Arie W. 
Kruglanski. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Kanai, R., Feilden, T., Firth, C., & Rees, G. 2011. Political orientations are correlated with brain 
structure in young adults. Current Biology, 21: 677–680. 
 
105 
 
Kaplan, S., & Vakili, K. 2015. The double‐edged sword of recombination in radical innovation. 
Strategic Management Journal, 36(10): 1435-1457. 
Kashmiri, S., & Mahajan, V. 2017. Values that shape marketing decisions: influence of chief 
executive officers’ political ideologies on innovation propensity, shareholder value, and 
risk. Journal of Marketing Research, 54(2): 260-278. 
Katila, R., & Ahuja, G. 2002. Something old, something new: A longitudinal study of search 
behavior and new product introduction. Academy of management journal, 45(6), 1183-
1194. 
Kennedy, P. 2008. A guide to econometrics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Kehoe, R. R., & Tzabbar, D. 2015. Lighting the way or stealing the shine? An examination of the 
duality in star scientists' effects on firm innovative performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 36(5): 709-727. 
Kerlinger, F.1984. Liberalism and conservatism: the nature and structure of social attitudes. 
Hllsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Khan, B., Robbins, C., & Okrent, A. 2020. The State of US Science and Engineering 2020. 
National Science Foundation, 15 January. https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20201.  
Kim, I., Pantzalis, C., & Park, J. C. 2013. Corporate boards' political ideology diversity and firm 
performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 21: 223-240. 
Kor, Y. Y.2006. Direct and interaction effects of top management team and board compositions 
on R&D investment strategy. Strategic management journal, 27(11): 1081-1099. 
Lahiri, N. 2010. Geographic distribution of R&D activity: how does it affect innovation quality? 
Academy of Management Journal, 53(5): 1194-1209. 
Lavie, D., Stettner, U., & Tushman, M. L.2010. Exploration and exploitation within and across 
organizations. Academy of Management annals, 4(1): 109-155. 
Lee, J. M., Kim, J., & Bae, J. 2020. Founder CEOs and innovation: Evidence from CEO sudden 
deaths in public firms. Research Policy, 49(1): 103862. 
Lee, J., Lee, K. J., & Nagarajan, N. J.2014. Birds of a feather: Value implications of political 
alignment between top management and directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 
112(2): 232-250. 
Levendusky, M.2009. The partisan sort: How liberals became Democrats and conservatives 
became Republicans. University of Chicago Press. 
Levinthal, D. A. 1991. Organizational adaptation and environmental selection-interrelated 
processes of change. Organization science, 2(1): 140-145. 
 
106 
 
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic management journal, 
14(S2): 95-112. 
Lim, K.2000. Basic research, applied research and innovation in the semiconductor and 
pharmaceutical industries (Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
Long, J. S., & Fox, M. F.1995. Scientific careers: Universalism and particularism. Annual review 
of sociology, 21(1): 45-71. 
Mansfield, E. 1968. Industrial research and technological innovation; An econometric analysis. 
New York, NY: Norton. 
Manso, G.2011. Motivating innovation. The Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1823-1860. 
March, J. G.1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization science, 
2(1): 71-87. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. 2006. The logic of appropriateness. In M. Rein, M. Moran & R. E. 
Goodin (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public policy: 689–708. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press 
March, J. G., & Shapira, Z.1987. Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking. Management 
science, 33(11): 1404-1418. 
Matta, E., & Beamish, P. W. 2008. The accentuated CEO career horizon problem: Evidence 
from international acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal, 29(7): 683-700. 
Marx, M., & Fuegi, A. 2020. Reliance on science: Worldwide front‐page patent citations to 
scientific articles. Strategic Management Journal, 41:1572–1594. 
McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. 2006. Polarized America: The dance of ideology and 
unequal riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
McCrae, R. R. (1987). Creativity, divergent thinking, and openness to experience. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 1258 – 1265 
McCrae, R. R., & John, O. P. (1992). An introduction to the five‐factor model and its 
applications. Journal of personality, 60(2), 175-215. 
McMillan, G. S., Narin, F., & Deeds, D. L.2000. An analysis of the critical role of public science 
in innovation: the case of biotechnology. Research policy, 29(1): 1-8. 
Meindl, J. R., Ehrlich, S. B., & Dukerich, J. M. 1985. The romance of leadership. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 30: 78-102. 
Mellahi, K., Frynas, J. G., Sun, P., & Siegel, D. 2016. A review of the nonmarket strategy 
literature: Toward a multi-theoretical integration. Journal of Management, 42(1): 143-
173. 
 
107 
 
Miller, D., Kets de Vries, M. F., & Toulouse, J. M. 1982. Top executive locus of control and its 
relationship to strategy-making, structure, and environment. Academy of Management 
Journal, 25(2): 237-253. 
Miller, D., & Toulouse, J. M. 1986. Chief executive personality and corporate strategy and 
structure in small firms. Management Science, 32(11): 1389-1409. 
Milli, J., Williams-Baron, E., Berlan, M., Xia, J., & Gault, B. 2016. Equity in innovation: women 
inventors and patents. Institute for Women’s Policy Research Report. 
https://iwpr.org/publications/equity-in-innovation-women-inventors-and-patents/ 
Moretti, E., & Wilson, D. J. 2017. The effect of state taxes on the geographical location of top 
earners: Evidence from star scientists. American Economic Review, 107(7): 1858-1903. 
Moskowitz, G. B. 2005. Social cognition: Understanding self and others. New York, NY: 
Guilford Press.  
Murray, F., & Graham, L. 2007. Buying science and selling science: gender differences in the 
market for commercial science. Industrial and Corporate Change, 16(4): 657-689. 
Nadkarni, S., & Chen, J. 2014. Bridging yesterday, today, and tomorrow: CEO temporal focus, 
environmental dynamism, and rate of new product introduction. Academy of Management 
Journal, 57(6): 1810-1833. 
Naldi, F., Luzi, D., Valente, A., Parenti, H. V. 2004. Scientific and technological performance by 
gender, In: H. F. MOED et al. (Eds), Handbook of Quantitative Science and Technology 
Research, 299–314. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Nelson, R. R. 1959. The simple economics of basic scientific research. Journal of political 
economy, 67(3): 297-306. 
Nelson, R. 1962. The link between science and invention: The case of the transistor. In The rate 
and direction of inventive activity: Economic and social factors. 549-584. Princeton 
University Press. 
Nerkar, A. 2003. Old is gold? The value of temporal exploration in the creation of new 
knowledge. Management science, 49(2), 211-229. 
Ng, E. S., & Sears, G. J. 2012. CEO leadership styles and the implementation of organizational 
diversity practices: Moderating effects of social values and age. Journal of business 
ethics, 105(1): 41-52. 
Ng, E. S., & Sears, G. J. 2020. Walking the talk on diversity: CEO beliefs, moral values, and the 
implementation of workplace diversity practices. Journal of Business Ethics, 164(3): 437-
450. 
 
108 
 
Palvia, A., Vähämaa, E., & Vähämaa, S. 2015. Are female CEOs and chairwomen more 
conservative and risk averse? Evidence from the banking industry during the financial 
crisis. Journal of Business Ethics, 131(3): 577-594. 
Park, U. D., Boeker, W., & Gomulya, D. 2020. Political ideology of the board and CEO 
dismissal following financial misconduct. Strategic Management Journal, 41(1): 108-
123. 
Phene, A., Fladmoe‐Lindquist, K., & Marsh, L. 2006. Breakthrough innovations in the US 
biotechnology industry: the effects of technological space and geographic origin. 
Strategic management journal, 27(4): 369-388. 
Pollock, T. G., Fischer, H. M., & Wade, J. B. 2002. The role of power and politics in the 
repricing of executive options. Academy of Management Journal, 45(6), 1172-1182. 
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. 1984. The polarization of American politics. The Journal of 
Politics, 46(4): 1061-1079. 
Ridgeway, C. L., & Smith-Lovin, L.1999. The gender system and interaction. Annual review of 
sociology, 25(1), 191-216. 
Rosenberg, N. 1990. Why do firms do basic research (with their own money)? Research Policv, 
19: 165-174  
Saad, L., 2019. U.S. Still Leans Conservative, but Liberals Keep Recent Gains. Gallup. 8 
January. https://news.gallup.com/poll/245813/leans-conservative-liberals-keep-recent-
gains.aspx 
Sanders, W. G. 2001. Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock option pay. 
Academy of Management journal, 44(3): 477-492. 
Sanders, W. G., & Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock 
options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 
50(5): 1055-1078. 
Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. 1999. Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults' political 
predispositions. The Journal of Politics, 61(1): 1-28. 
Sibley, C. G., Osborne, D., & Duckitt, J. 2012. Personality and political orientation: Meta-
analysis and test of a Threat-Constraint Model. Journal of Research in Personality, 46(6): 
664-677. 
Schneider, B. 1987. The people make the place. Personnel Psychology, 40(3): 437-453. 
Schreiber, D., Fonzo, G., Simmons, A. N., Dawes, C. T., Flagan, T., Fowler, J. H., & Paulus, M. 
P. 2013. Red brain, blue brain: Evaluative processes differ in Democrats and 
Republicans. PLoS one, 8(2). e52970  
 
109 
 
Schumpeter, J. 1942. Capitalism, socialism and democracy, New York, NY: Harper & Row 
Shi, W., Connelly, B. L., Mackey, J. D., & Gupta, A. 2019. Placing their bets: The influence of 
strategic investment on CEO pay‐for‐performance. Strategic Management Journal, 
40(12): 2047-2077. 
Singh, J., & Fleming, L. 2010. Lone inventors as sources of breakthroughs: Myth or reality? 
Management science, 56(1): 41-56. 
Song, J., Almeida, P., & Wu, G. 2003. Learning–by–hiring: When is mobility more likely to 
facilitate interfirm knowledge transfer? Management science, 49(4): 351-365. 
Steffensen Jr, D. S., Ellen III, B. P., Wang, G., & Ferris, G. R. 2019. Putting the “management” 
back in human resource management: a review and agenda for future research. Journal of 
Management, 45(6), 2387-2418. 
Sunder, J., Sunder, S. V., & Zhang, J. 2017. Pilot CEOs and corporate innovation. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 123(1): 209-224. 
Swigart, K. L., Anantharaman, A., Williamson, J. A., & Grandey, A. A. 2020. Working While 
Liberal/Conservative: A Review of Political Ideology in Organizations. Journal of 
Management.46(6): 1063–1091  
Tajfel H., Turner J.C. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In: Austin WG, Worchel S, 
editors. The social psychology of intergroup relations. Brooks/Cole; Monterey, CA: 
1979: 33–47. 
Tang, Y., Li, J., & Yang, H. 2015. What I see, what I do: How executive hubris affects firm 
innovation. Journal of Management, 41(6): 1698-1723. 
Tedin, K. L. 1987. Political ideology and the vote. Research in micropolitics, 2(1): 63-94. 
Tetlock, P. E. 2000. Cognitive biases and organizational correctives: Do both disease and cure 
depend on the politics of the beholder? Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(2): 293-326. 
Thompson, V. A. 1965. Bureaucracy and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1-20. 
Trajtenberg, M., Henderson, R., & Jaffe, A. 1992. Ivory tower versus corporate lab: An 
empirical study of basic research and appropriability (No. w4146). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2019. Fact Sheet No. 55: Women in Science. June. 
http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/fs55-women-in-science-2019-en.pdf 
United States Patent and Trademark Office. 2019. Progress and potential: A profile of women 
inventors on U.S. patents. https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Progress-
and-Potential.pdf 
 
110 
 
Unsal, O., Hassan, M. K., & Zirek, D. 2016. Corporate lobbying, CEO political ideology and 
firm performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 38:126-149. 
Van de Ven, A. H. 1986. Central problems in the management of innovation. Management 
science, 32(5): 590-607. 
Van Knippenberg, D., De Dreu, C. K., & Homan, A. C. 2004. Work group diversity and group 
performance: An integrative model and research agenda. Journal of applied psychology, 
89(6): 1008 –1022. 
Ware, A. 1996. Political parties and party systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Weiner, B., Osborne, D., & Rudolph, U. (2011). An attributional analysis of reactions to poverty: 
The political ideology of the giver and the perceived morality of the receiver. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 15(2), 199-213. 
Whittington, K. B. 2011. Mothers of invention? Gender, motherhood, and new dimensions of 
productivity in the science profession. Work and Occupations, 38(3): 417-456. 
Whittington, K. B. 2018. A tie is a tie? Gender and network positioning in life science inventor 
collaboration. Research Policy, 47(2): 511-526. 
Whittington, K. B., & Smith-Doerr, L. 2005. Gender and commercial science: Women’s 
patenting in the life sciences. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 30(4): 355-370. 
Wilden, R., Hohberger, J., Devinney, T. M., & Lavie, D. 2018. Revisiting James March (1991): 
whither exploration and exploitation? Strategic Organization, 16(3): 352-369. 
Wouters, O. J., McKee, M., & Luyten, J. 2020. Estimated research and development investment 
needed to bring a new medicine to market, 2009-2018. Jama, 323(9): 844-853. 
Xie, L., Zhou, J., Zong, Q., & Lu, Q. 2020. Gender diversity in R&D teams and innovation 
efficiency: Role of the innovation context. Research Policy, 49(1), 103885. 
Yadav, M. S., Prabhu, J. C., & Chandy, R. K. 2007. Managing the future: CEO attention and 
innovation outcomes. Journal of Marketing, 71(4): 84-101. 
Zahra, S. A., & Covin, J. G. 1994. The financial implications of fit between competitive strategy 
and innovation types and sources. The Journal of High Technology Management 
Research, 5(2): 183-211. 
Zhang, H., Ou, A. Y., Tsui, A. S., & Wang, H. 2017. CEO humility, narcissism and firm 
innovation: A paradox perspective on CEO traits. The Leadership Quarterly, 28(5): 585-
604. 
Zucker, L. G., Darby, M. R., & Torero, M. 2002. Labor mobility from academe to commerce. 
Journal of Labor Economics, 20(3): 629-660. 
 
111 
 
Zucker, L. G., & Darby, M. R. 1997. Individual action and the demand for institutions: Star 
scientists and institutional transformation. American Behavioral Scientist, 40(4): 502-
513. 
Zucker, G. S., & Weiner, B. (1993). Conservatism and perceptions of poverty: An attributional 
analysis 1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23(12), 925-943. 
 
 
112 
 
 
VITA 
Samira Fallah earned her Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Industrial Engineering from 
Amirkabir University of Technology in Tehran, Iran in 2007 and 2010 respectively. Before 
joining Louisiana State University in 2015 to pursue a PhD in Management, Samira worked for 
several years in information technology and construction industries in Iran as a management 
systems’ consultant and specialist. Samira’s area of research is top management teams. She has 
particular interest in studying how CEOs make strategic decisions and what factors determines 
CEOs’ fate in organizations. Samira is a big fan of photography and enjoyed taking pictures of 
Louisiana’s incredible nature over the years of living in Baton Rouge.  
 
 
 
